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The Sonoran desert spans nearly 100,000 square miles; a magnificent wilderness ornamented by 
saguaros and ragged mountain ranges. The diverse landscape, an amalgamation of various 
terrain, is the definitive backdrop of the western portion of the U.S.-Mexico border. These 
borderlands are also home to remains: discovered or undiscovered, the bones scattered around 
the Southwestern U.S. border are a gripping testimony to the cruel weaponization of the desert. 
In early 2018, humanitarian aid organization No More Deaths released a report detailing the 
border patrol’s purposeful destruction of supplies left out in the desert for migrants. Hours later, 
a volunteer with the organization named Scott Warren was arrested and charged with a felony for 
harboring migrants. Allegedly, border patrol had witnessed him providing food and water to two 
migrants in the Cabeza Prieta wilderness and for this, Warren faced up to five years in prison.  1
In August of 2019, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services eliminated a 
deferred action program without precedent or public notice. The intention of this program was to 
withhold deportation for those who, or whose relatives, were undergoing lifesaving medical 
treatment. Recipients of this program received a letter, explaining that if they did not leave the 
country within 33 days, they would be subject to deportation. Many of the patients who received 
these letters suffered from debilitating diseases such as cancer, cystic fibrosis, HIV, and epilepsy. 
Family members and doctors alike described the elimination of this program as a “death 
sentence,” unable to continue the necessary treatment if deported.  2
1 Scott Warren, “I gave water to migrants crossing the Arizona desert. They charged me with a felony,” ​The 
Washington Post, ​28 May 2019. 
2 Mimi Jordan and Caitlin Dickerson, “Sick Migrants Undergoing Lifesaving Care Can Now Be Deported,” ​The 
New York Times, ​29 August 2019. 
2 
In April of 2020, amid the covid-19 pandemic, 44 migrants aboard the same deportation 
flight from the U.S. to Guatemala tested positive for the disease. Deportees from the U.S. are 
reported to make up 20% of the 500 cases in Guatemala at the time I am writing this.  As U.S. 3
deportations continue and the disease spreads, it is likely that the populations of infected 
individuals around the world will increase by the day. The deportation of individuals to other 
countries now not only signifies the repatriation of particular individuals, but the exportation of a 
deadly virus. 
The cases I have presented here are only a magnification of global migration dynamics, 
limited to one single country and spanning only three short years. In reality, the conditions that 
have allowed for each case traverse both nations and decades. When presented in a vacuum, the 
three instances I have listed might appear unnecessarily cruel: under what circumstances is it 
wrong to provide water to a person dying of thirst? What threat does a child suffering from 
cancer pose to national security? Is the deportation of 100 people really worth the exacerbation 
of a pandemic?  
Viewing each case as not an isolated incident, but in part with a greater legacy of 
nationhood and migration contextualizes the events at work. However, the same questions 
remain unanswered. Migration has been thematic in my life, owing to the recent history of 
migration on both sides of my family as well as its pervasiveness within political discourse in the 
last few decades. Throughout years of exposure to discourse of migration, I have heard a number 
of justifications for the deportation of migrants and the securitization of our borders; the tamest 
of which resort to abstract national security principles, while the most emphatic homogenize 
3 Natalie Gallón, “44 Migrants on one U.S. deportation flight tested positive for coronavirus,” ​CNN. ​17 April 2020. 
3 
migrants into a faceless mass, characterized by criminality and societal denigration. And yet, the 
questions I have posed regarding the three cases presented persist. Exactly what threat do the 
migrant dying of thirst and the sick child pose to the great nation of America? Or, rather, how 
does the United States benefit from a migrant’s dehydration, lack of medical care, or deportation 
amidst a dangerous pandemic? As I attempt to answer each inquiry, I find them merging into 
one, overarching question: why is the migrant so destabilizing? 
To this question, I respond simply that the migrant is such a destabilizing figure because 
the nation state requires them to be. In what follows, I will argue that the migrant, as a 
transnational figure, threatens to undermine the logic of nationhood and is thus subject to a 
process of rendering in which they are exposed to the forces of sovereign violence. In doing so, 
the nation-state transforms migrants into politically serviceable bodies that it may use to 
reproduce its own sovereignty - the final step in a bloody cycle of self-legitimation upon which 
our nationalized system depends. 
In the first chapter, I will establish a paradox of national sovereignty, beginning with an 
examination of the logic of the nation-state. I hope to first observe the condition of inclusion and 
exclusion, upon which the nation-state is perceived to operate: in essence, the understanding that 
those who reside within a particular nation’s borders are included within that nation-state and, 
therefore, those who reside without are excluded. Effectively, the condition of inclusion within 
one nation-state renders the condition of exclusion within all others. I will then destabilize the 
dichotomy of inclusion and inclusion, emphasizing how the transnational nature of migration and 
statelessness resists such a binary and, in doing so, complicates widely-held perceptions of 
citizenship, localization, and boundaries. The migrant inherently threatens the conventional logic 
4 
on which the nation-state depends, threatening to expose the constructed foundation of 
nationalization and, therefore, threatening the very sovereignty of the nation-state. I argue then 
that the state manages to evade such exposure not through the elimination of the migrant, but 
through the dissemination of discourse that portrays migrants as threats towards national security 
and prosperity. Through this process, the nation-state is able engage in the performative 
production of its own sovereignty, highlighting the paradox of national sovereignty: as the 
transnational nature of migration and statelessness threatens logic of the nation-state, the 
nation-state simultaneously relies upon such a threat in order to legitimize its sovereignty in the 
eyes of its citizens. Plainly, the transnationality of the migrant is a fact upon which the 
nation-state is conditional - without it, the production of national sovereignty would be 
impossible and the nation-state would ultimately shatter.  
The second chapter will serve as an exploration into national borders in three parts. The 
first section will consist of a discussion of the conventional wisdom surrounding national 
borders, in which borders are perceived as territorially-bound barriers with specific geographical 
locations and limitations. I will challenge this conception, arguing that the border is not a 
territorial entity but an aphysical one. Rather than providing a geographical boundary between 
insiders and outsiders, I assert that the national border provides a condition of existence upon 
those who find themselves at the intersection of sovereignty and statelessness. The condition of 
the national border, then, is not affixed to the seam of two nation-states, but permeates the 
entirety of the nation-state, placing migrants in a semi-permanent state of exception. The second 
section of this chapter will provide an analysis of Agamben’s notion of sacred life as it pertains 
to national borders, observing how the border functions not as a barrier but as a rendering 
5 
process that strips migrants of their political life, exposing them to the forces of sovereign 
violence. I will examine how such a process subverts conventional conceptions of belonging, 
revealing how the perceived binary of citizenship serves instead as a spectrum. The spectrum of 
citizenship, I argue, can be divided into three ambiguous and flexible classifications of 
anti-citizen, quasi-citizen, and citizen, with each being defined not by their relation to inclusion, 
but their relation to death. In the third and final section, I will discuss how the border-rendering 
process contributes to the purposeful erasure and exploitation of the migrant. Cheifly, I argue 
that the nation-state engages in a process of sovereign reproduction, weaponizing national 
borders as means of reducing the migrant to bare life and thereby exposing them to sovereign 
violence. In imposing violence upon the migrant, the nation-state is able to subordinate the 
migrant through means of labor exploitation, detention, and physical harm. 
The final chapter will be dedicated to an empirical demonstration of my findings, in 
which I will examine the operation of the Southwestern United States border with Mexico in 
order to contextualize my findings. Following a brief analysis of U.S. involvement in Latin 
American affairs, I will discuss the discourses of danger that surround the presence of Mexican 
and Central American migrants in the United States. In order to display the imposition of 
sovereign violence upon these migrants, I will turn to three groups of policy: illegalization, 
deterrence, and zero-tolerance. Finally, I aim to demonstrate how, through the exploitation and 
erasure of the migrant within the United States, the nation-state fulfills a cycle of 
self-reproduction and, in doing so, fortifies its sovereignty. Ultimately, I intend to illustrate how 
national sovereignty requires the subordination and violation of migrants, laying the bloody 
groundwork upon which every nation-state is constructed.  
6 
Chapter 1: The Nation  
The Paradox of the National Logic 
 
The exploitation and subjugation of the border-crossing migrant is not an unfortunate risk of 
nationalization, but a metric of its success. Understanding both sovereign violence and the ways 
in which migrants are subjected to it requires first an understanding of the nation-state itself. The 
logic of the nation-state is widely conceived to be conditional on a basis of inclusion and 
exclusion: those who reside within a particular nation-state are included and those who reside 
without are excluded; similarly, those who are included within one nation-state are excluded by 
all others. In my analysis of the nation-state, I propose a destabilization of this dichotomy, taking 
into consideration how contradictory factors like citizenship and localization confound the 
inclusion/exclusion binary and furthermore, how the inclusive exclusion of the migrant exposes 
the construction upon which the nation-state finds its legitimacy. I then observe how the 
nation-state is able to evade such exposure through the promulgation of discourse and policy that 
mischaracterizes the migrant as a threat to U.S. security and prosperity, while simultaneously 
gaining legitimacy through the response to that alleged threat. Ultimately, what I establish is the 
paradox of national sovereignty: while the transnational nature of cross-border migration poses a 
threat to national legitimacy and identity, the migrant themself is a condition of the existence of 
the nation-state - without which, the nation-state would be unable to legitimize its sovereignty in 
the eyes of its citizens and would subsequently disintegrate. 
Here, I aim to discuss the foundation of the nation-state as it is an imagined entity, insofar 
as it defines a distinct community within a set of other distinct communities with no natural or 
tangible geographical definition. Nation-states are both limited as well as imagined to have finite 
7 
boundaries beyond which lie other distinct membership communities - other nation-states.  Both 4
the imagined and the limited quality of the nation-state is imperative to understanding the logic 
of a nationalized system, and moreover, to understanding the need for nation-states to maintain a 
legitimate, sovereign identity in the eyes of its citizens. I will use these concepts in order to 
demonstrate how such a system attempts to erase any possibility for ambiguity in an individual’s 
relation to distinct sovereign nations, and how the migrant is ultimately the physical 
representation of ambiguity within an international system. Though this ambiguity threatens to 
expose the fact of a nation’s sovereignty as legitimate only in that it is imagined - revealing the 
fragility of sovereignty - the nation-state is able to mechanize the migrant’s indeterminate 
national belonging to aid in the ceaseless quest for national legitimacy. In this process, the 
migrant is falsely characterized as a threat to the security and prosperity of the nation and 
subsequently made subject to violent subordination. Forcibly made to take part in the quest for 
sovereign legitimacy, the migrant is rewarded with exploitation, violence, and erasure, as the 
sovereign nation enjoys a renewed sense of security in its legitimacy. 
 
Inclusive Exclusion 
In order to truly grasp the logic of the nation-state, it is vital to take into account what the 
nation-state is not. Emma Haddad notes the duality of sovereign governments:​  ​“International 
society divides the world into sovereign states. Sovereignty means authority – external autonomy 
and internal control. A sovereign government is therefore Janus-faced: it simultaneously faces 
outwards at other states and inwards at its population.”  Haddad’s conception of a “Janus-faced” 5
4 Emma Haddad, ​The Refugee in International Society ​(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 54. 
5 Ibid., 48. 
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sovereign government highlights what is perhaps the most critical component to the identity 
formation of a nation-state: an external body for which the nation-state’s identity may be formed 
not with, but against. What defines those who are included is those who are excluded; the citizen 
is not only inherently connected to, but contingent on, the outsider.  Without the imagined 6
outsider, the citizen would be indistinguishable, for the existence of an included body 
necessitates a body that is excluded. The existence of a marked outsider - a foreigner, an alien, an 
other - is necessary for citizenship to have any meaning, and thus, necessary for the nation-state 
to be able to identify as such (as sovereignty depends on a citizenry over which to be sovereign).  
 
Insider/Outsider Convention 
David Campbell discusses the basis upon which identity is constituted, writing, “Whether 
we are talking of ‘the body’ or ‘the state,’ or of particular bodies and states, the identity of each 
is performatively constituted. Moreover, the constitution of identity is achieved through the 
inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside,’ a ‘self’ from an 
‘other,’ a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign.”  Plainly, the nation-state requires non-citizens - who can 7
viably be citizens of a different nation-state - to distinguish its own citizens, and thus legitimize 
its own sovereignty. Therefore, a viable assumption would be that the nation-state actually 
requires the outsider - the excluded body. However, when that which is external aims to move 
inward, it threatens the very logic of the nation-state. It is for this reason I aim to shift my focus 
from simply the figure of the outsider to that of the migrant, specifically the migrant whose 
6 Haddad, ​The Refugee in International Society, ​54. 
7 David Campbell, ​Writing Security ​(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992) 9. 
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intent or attempt to cross a national border both complicates and illuminates the fundamental 
operation of the nation-state. 
The simultaneous inclusion of citizens and externality of the foreign has allowed a fragile 
dichotomy to take place, one whose inverse logic suggests an inherent mutual exclusion. For 
example, a single person exists in a constant state of inclusion ​and ​exclusion, but only in that 
they are included in one state, and therefore, excluded from all others. However, the mutual 
exclusion applies in regards to a person’s relation to a single nation state: if a person is included 
in one particular nation-state, it would seem impossible that they are simultaneously excluded 
from that same nation-state. As “inclusion” and “exclusion” are oxymoronic in nature, a person 
seemingly may not take on both the role of an insider and an outsider in relation to a single 
nation-state. However, the transnationality of migration renders the fragile binary of inclusion 
and exclusion entirely obscured.  
 
Transnationality and Statelessness 
The migrant who aims to cross a national border certainly qualifies as an outsider figure 
on the basis of their intent to permeate a boundary which is largely understood to demarcate 
insider from outsider. Here is the migrant’s relation to border-crossing: it is their intent, attempt, 
or success in crossing a national border. Once the migrant enters into this relation, they at once 
compromise the logic of the nation-state. In a nationalized world composed of mutually 
exclusive states, it seems reasonable to determine that every person is included within a 
particular sovereign body, and excluded by all other sovereign bodies that lie beyond its borders. 
Inclusion itself instinctively signifies a form of belonging or membership to that sovereign body, 
10 
which largely manifests as citizenship within the current international order. Yet, the migrant’s 
relation to border-crossing unravels this conventional wisdom, in that the migrant cannot 
possibly leave one country without eventually entering into another one.  Primarily, what this 8
truth reveals is the necessary distinction between localization and legal membership. While 
national borders are generally conceived to define the insider (citizen) from the outsider 
(foreigner), it is not necessarily valid that all those who are located within a set of borders are 
citizens of that nation-state and those who lie beyond are not (many citizens travel, work, and 
reside within countries of which they are not citizens). Therefore, location alone does not 
determine a person’s insider/outsider status in relation to a particular nation-state. That being 
said, I do not wish to argue that a migrant who becomes located in a nation-state of which they 
are not a citizen entirely destabilizes the dichotomous principle of inclusion/exclusion that 
founds the nation-state - they may be geographically included within the borders of nation they 
immigrate to, but remain more largely excluded if they are not citizens of that country. That 
migrant must simply have their relationship to a specific sovereign body redefined - through a 
process such as repatriation or naturalization - in order to become reterritorialized and thereby 
reaffirm the imagined nation-state (and in doing so, becoming technically “included.”)  In short, 9
the migrant’s reterritorialization legitimizes the nation-state’s hegemony; in redefining a 
migrant’s belonging to a particular nation, the nation-state not only emphasizes its own control 
over matters of belonging but simultaneously fortifies the belief that every person must, in some 
way, belong to a nation-state. 
8 Haddad, ​The Refugee in International Society, ​26. 
9 Ibid., 60. 
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What complicates the inclusion/exclusion principle is the process of redefining a 
migrant’s relation to a sovereign body - and thereby reaffirming the inclusion/exclusion binary - 
when addressing stateless peoples. An extensive number of migrants, and those on whom I am 
largely focused, aim to cross national borders owing to the fact that their own nation-citizen 
relation has been severed. If the nation-state is charged with the protection of its citizens, a lack 
of sovereign protection from factors that undermine quality of life or threaten it entirely - or 
perpetuation by the sovereign government of these factors - may force a person to leave their 
nation-state, rendering one who was once a citizen stateless. The stateless migrant is perhaps 
more destabilizing than any other, serving as an embodiment of what the nation-state wishes to 
conceal: in their absence of belonging to any particular nation-state, the stateless migrant 
occupies a liminal space that does not conform to a nationalized system in that they are not truly 
included in any one nation-state. There lies an innate tension in the occupation of such a space, 
as the nationalized order in place determines that it is nearly impossible to be geographically 
located in such a way that one is not “included” - physically - within some set of national 
borders, and yet the stateless person remains in a state of exclusion, regardless of their physical 
location. Therefore, the stateless person exposes more potently than any other that inclusion and 
exclusion are not physical truths, territorially-bound through borders, but political constructions. 
The condition of statelessness is nearly intolerable to the nation-state, an entity that depends on 
the concealment of its own construction in order to remain sovereign - for it is an imagined 
community, perceived by its citizens to be a bounded, organic space of inclusion with finite 
borders. The sovereignty of the nation-state depends on this perception, yet it is this perception 
12 
that inherently contradicts the “imagined,” constructed quality of the nation-state. Were its 
constructedness to be revealed, the imagined community would ultimately be at risk of fracture. 
Despite the inherent threat the stateless person provides, the condition of statelessness is a 
symptom of nationalization, only possible through the narrative of territoriality and sovereignty 
that the nation-state provides. Nation-states in which citizens are facing persecution, 
displacement, or lack of representation are likely to yield significant numbers of migrants who 
flee to neighboring countries. A widespread misconception regarding stateless migrants is that 
they innately qualify as refugees, owing to the lack of protection provided by their originary 
nation-state and the danger they face as a result. Despite the qualifications for refugee status set 
by the 1951 Refugee Convention , history would see that, when confronted by mass migration 10
(owing to human rights violations), the nations to which those migrants are most likely to flee 
respond with policy that limits the ability of those migrants to obtain asylum, citizenship, or 
residency. Examples of such policies include restrictions placed on migration to the U.S. from 
Nazi-occupied territory prior to and during World War II;   the inaction following the 11
implementation of EU quotas for accepting non-EU asylum seekers after 2015 following 
displacement in North Africa and the Middle  East;  the Trump administration’s frequent 12
10 The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone who: “owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. In the case of a person who has more than 
one nationality, the term ‘the country of his nationality’ shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, 
and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid 
reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is 
a national.” 
11 Richard Breitman, “The Troubling History of How America’s ‘Public Charge’ Rule Blocked​ ​Jews Fleeing Nazi 
Germany,” ​TIME, ​29 October 2019. 
12 Despite quotas set for the relocation of non-EU asylum seekers from Greece and Italy in 2015, Amnesty 
International reports that most countries failed to fulfill them within the two-year period designated: Poland and 
Hungary refused to accept any refugees; Slovakia accepted 16 of the 902 asylum-seekers it was assigned; the Czech 
13 
attempts to restrict migration from those fleeing gang violence in the Northern Triangle.  On the 13
subject of refugeedom, Haddad observes,  
A wide definition of who falls into the category ‘refugee’ may increase the potential 
burden on the host state, while accepting a greater failure on the part of the state of 
origin. A narrow definition, on the other hand, runs the risk of denying protection and 
assistance to individuals in need and thus not fulfilling basic moral and humanitarian 
obligations. The granting of refugee status has therefore come to mean that asylum is 
more an ‘entitlement’ than ‘a discretionary bestowal of political grace’... hence asylum 
and refugee status is now ‘a scarce resource’ the scarcity of which, however, is political 
and not physical.  14
 
The “political scarcity” noted by Haddad lends itself to strategies that restrict qualifications for 
refugee status from countries that are producing high numbers of asylum-seekers. In the wake of 
policies that limit eligibility for asylum, the stateless migrant is left unrepresented by any 
sovereign nation - despite the fact that, due to the nationalized system in place, it is impossible 
for that migrant to be geographically excluded from ​all ​nations; they must at all times be within 
one nation’s borders, and thus, arguably qualify as geographically “included” within that nation 
owing only to their localization. 
A migrant’s ability to be “included” in the nation to which they migrate is further 
complicated by the legality of seeking asylum, including laws that impact migration before ​and 
after asylum is officially sought. While the right of any person to seek asylum is theoretically 
Republic accepted 12 of 2,691; Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal accepted less than 50%; Finland and 
Ireland accepted over 75% but did not satisfy their quotas; Malta was the only country to fulfill its quota; Norway 
and Lichtenstein voluntarily opted in to the process and fulfilled their commitments. 
13 In June of 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions ordered that claims of gang violence and domestic violence 
are not grounds for protection in the United States, following the dramatic increase of gang violence in the Northern 
Triangle, producing thousands of asylum-seekers who reach the Southwestern U.S. border.  
14 Haddad, ​The Refugee in International Society, ​26. 
14 
upheld by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights  and the 1951 Refugee Convention, 15
a specter of illegality is omnipresent as stateless people seek asylum is present even before they 
cross a national border. Furthermore, the illegality that accompanies statelss migration applies to 
more than just the asylum-seeker themself. Particular cases have gained worldwide recognition 
cocnerning individuals who attempt to provide humanitarian aid (such as water and food) for 
asylum seekers have been prosecuted and brought up on various charges, including trespassing 
and abandonment of personal property.  Similarly, others who attempt to physically accompany 16
a migrant in their quest to reach a national border have been convicted or fought charges such as 
aiding-and-abetting. Certain countries have managed to sidestep the legality of asylum-seeking 
with laws that successfully curtail rescue missions intended for migrants crossing dangerous 
terrain (such as ocean or desert), including laws that criminalize the docking of rescue ships in 
particular ports and national shores.  17
If a migrant does successfully reach the borders of a nation in which they can safely seek 
asylum, many are still denied refugee status. Nicholas De Genova discusses the qualifications for 
refugee status:  
 
Indeed, the criteria for granting asylum tend to be so stringent, so completely predicated 
upon suspicion, that it is perfectly reasonable to contend that what asylum regimes really 
produce is a mass of purportedly 'bogus' asylum seekers. Hence, in systematic and 
predictable ways, asylum regimes disproportionately disqualify asylum seekers, and 
convert them into 'illegal' and deportable 'migrants'. All such officially 'unwanted' or 
15 Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution.This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising 
from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.” 
16 Scott Warren, “I gave water to migrants crossing the Arizona desert. They charged me with a felony,” ​The 
Washington Post, ​28 May 2019. 
17 German sea-captain Pia Klemp rescued over 1,000 migrants in the Mediterranean sea before her boat was seized 
by Italian authorities. As of 2020, she faces 20 years in prison for aiding-and-abetting. Another German sea-captain, 
Carola Rackete, was arrested in 2019 for illegally docking at an Italian port with 40 migrants on board. (Dixon and 
Wojazer) 
15 
'undesirable' non-citizens are stigmatized with allegations of opportunism, duplicity and 
undeservingness. The compulsive denunciation, humiliation and exquisitely refined 
rightlessness of deportable 'foreigners', furthermore, supply the rationale for 
essentializing the juridical inequalities of citizenship and alienage as categorical 
differences that may be racialized.  18
 
De Genova emphasizes another critical truth of this process: the systemic manner in 
which those who have crossed a border and have been denied asylum are once again targets of 
illegality, now becoming stigmatized and disqualified from citizenship entirely. Therefore, a 
migrant who has crossed a national border and has become geographically included remains 
truly excluded, having not been reterritorialized according to the standards of the nation-state by 
obtaining citizenship or a sanctioned alternative, such as residency or refugee status.  
 
State of Inclusive Exclusion 
The migrant then enters into a paradoxical state of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, 
summarily entering into a state of what Giorgio Agamben terms “inclusive exclusion.” 
Agamben’s work ​Homo Sacer ​details inclusive exclusion as it provides a distinction between 
“bare life” - the simple fact of biological life common to living beings - and “good life” - the 
transformation of bare life by the state into political life (offered by citizenship). Agamben 
argues that sovereign power is established through the production of a political order that 
excludes bare life from law in favor of good life. Sovereign power is realized when it enters a 
state of exception, wherein the law is suspended (consider emergency powers or martial law) 
and, owing to this, the human being is stripped of their rights and reduced to a state of bare life. 
Thus, bare life is included by exclusion: excluded from law but presupposed in its exclusion, 
18 Nicholas De Genova, “Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion,” ​Ethnic 
and Racial Studies ​36, no. 7 (2013). 
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signifying its simultaneous inclusion. While it is life itself that Agamben analyzes through a lens 
of inclusive exclusion (arguing that life is included in politics by means of its exclusion ), the 19
migrant is particularly vulnerable to this process. In lacking citizenship but existing in relation to 
the nation from which they lack citizenship, the migrant finds themself inclusively excluded. 
This is not a simple matter of geographic localization, for simply being located within national 
borders does not alone qualify a migrant as “included.” Rather, in being rendered an illegal 
presence within a particular nation-state, the migrant is promptly excluded from citizenship and 
the protection provided by that nation-state; yet, in their exclusion and designation of a particular 
legal status, the migrant is presupposed and subject to the laws set forth by that nation-state, 
included too under the jurisdiction of that nation-state. The key distinction here is not simply that 
the migrant is both included and excluded, it is that they are included ​by way ​of their exclusion. 
The migrant’s state of inclusive exclusion is fundamentally at odds with the logic of the 
citizen, whose identity is contingent on an excluded body. Haddad details the status of a migrant 
who finds themself in this space of indistinction in relation to the citizen: “The citizen is 
unproblematic and rooted in her territorial space. The refugee constitutes a problem by lacking 
effective state representation and protection; she is uprooted, dislocated and displaced.”  The 20
migrant becomes problematized as they signify an abnormality in a system constituted of 
membership communities, where citizenship designates belonging, for this logic means the 
migrant does not belong anywhere.  It is nearly impossible to exist between nation-states within 21
a nationalized order, yet by existing between the dichotomous categories of inclusion and 
exclusion set by international society, the inclusively excluded migrant challenges the notion that 
19 Giorgio Agamben, ​Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life ​(California: Stanford University Press, 1998) ​ ​7. 
20 Haddad, ​The Refugee in International Society, ​59. 
21 Ibid., 60. 
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every individual belongs to a nation-state. As their transnational experience resists the logic of 
the nation-state, the migrant launches into question the legitimacy of state sovereignty, and 
exposes the imagined foundation on which the modern nation-state and its borders are 
constructed. 
Following her examination of the citizen/migrant relation, Haddad adds, “And if 
questions of membership, territory and legitimacy become security issues, persons will 
accordingly be given ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ status. Each individual will either add to the internal 
security of the community or threaten its cohesion by not belonging.”  Haddad’s emphasis on 22
security issues is critical in understanding the role of the migrant in the international system. 
Here, however, I would argue that “questions of membership, territory, and legitimacy” ​always 
become security issues for the nation-state, as membership, territory, and legitimacy are 
fundamental tenets of national sovereignty, and any force that questions or destabilizes the 
sovereignty of a nation-state instantly threatens to expose the constructedness of that state. The 
risk of that exposure could mean the nation’s loss of sovereign identity in the eyes of its citizens. 
Campbell discusses how the identity of a nation-state may come to be threatened: “The mere 
existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which exemplifies that different 
identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim of a particular identity to be ​the​ true 
identity, is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.”  The migrant’s intrinsic 23
state of in-between, emblemized by their simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, runs the risk of 
disrupting the cohesive conventions of statehood, citizenship, and externality. The migrant does 
intrinsically pose a threat to the security of the nation-state; however, the risk posed does not 
22 Ibid., 49. 
23 Campbell, ​Writing Security,​ 3. 
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target national economic or social security. Rather, it is the security of national legitimacy - it the 
nation-state’s role as a sovereign power, the nation-state’s security of identity.  
 
Specticality 
Confronted by the threat of the migrant, the nation-state has no choice but to respond. In 
the face of a threat that risks exposing the nation-state’s constructedness, one could argue that the 
most likely response of that nation-state is to eliminate the threat entirely. Yet, as I have stated, 
this is a matter of security - not economic or public security - but sovereign security. Owing to 
this fact, the instinctive response to such a threat becomes nebulous; the nation-state has the dual 
task of confronting the threat in such a way that both reinforces its own sovereignty and 
simultaneously conceals its construction. It is true that when facing an external threat to its 
security, the sovereign government of a nation-state is likely to respond by enacting policy that 
minimizes that external threat. However, to ordain policy publicly on the basis of protecting 
itself from delegitimation would simply expose what the nation-state is trying to conceal: the 
intangibility of its own borders, the fragility of its claim to sovereignty. Rather, the nation must 
take a different course of action - one that flaunts the danger presented by the migrant, only to 
falsely redirect the perceived recipient of that danger from its own legitimacy to the security and 
prosperity of its citizens. 
 
Performative Production 
But how is such a process achieved? I argue that the state weaponizes foreign policy, and 
the discourse it provides, in order to transform the migrant-border relation into a politically 
19 
advantageous spectacle. Campbell states that foreign policy is a “specific sort of 
boundary-producing political performance.”  According to Campbell, nation-states are able to 24
make use of discourse that reinforces the image of the migrant as a hazard to the public in order 
to similarly reinforce who is the insider and who is the outsider, who is citizen and who is 
foreign - and it is largely through migrant-oriented policy that these “discourses of danger” are 
strengthened. What is key here is the concept of performativity: a form of discursive power, in 
which, through language, a particular phenomena is produced in order to be controlled and 
regulated. In manufacturing discourse that paints outsiders as threats which must be contained, 
the nation-state is able to reinforce not only insider-outsider discourse, but the notion that the 
border is a barrier used to further delineate those two categories. Thus, the border, an inorganic 
referential point at the juncture of two nation-states, becomes a nearly tangible entity that has 
been fortified through discourses of danger.  
 
The Border Spectacle 
A critical element to the “boundary-producing political performance” that Campbell 
names is specticality. Through the diffusion of particular discursive elements, a particular issue 
becomes a public spectacle, allowing for the generation or reinforcement of a certain kind of 
discourse pertaining to that issue. For example, U.S. President Donald Trump’s highly publicized 
construction of a border wall, which he has openly supported since his 2016 campaign, is a 
spectacle - his increased securitization of the U.S.-Mexico border reinforces the perception of the 
border as an entity that must be securitized to the point of impenetrability, conveying the migrant 
24 Ibid., 62. 
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as an imminent threat and legitimizing anti-migrant sentiment. In a broader sense, the 
ever-growing exhibition of militarization, raids, deportations and detentions that has come to 
define many national borders creates what Nicholas De Genova refers to as the “Border 
Spectacle.” The Border Spectacle, De Genova argues, uses discourses of danger to supply a 
scene of exclusion that generates anti-migrant sentiment. I argue that the greatest purveyor of 
this spectacle is migrant-oriented policy. For instance, policies that criminalize unauthorized 
border crossings and broaden actions for which an individual may be deported reinforce the 
conflation of migrants and criminal behavior. Similarly, those which restrict migration according 
to financial status (often termed “public charge”laws) reaffirm the notion that migrants 
undermine national prosperity. Strategies aimed at securitizing national borders not only 
embolden the image of the border as a divide between the included and the excluded, but fortify 
the image of the foreigner, and especially the migrant, as a dangerous figure who must be met 
with militant securitization. Policies like these contribute to pre-existing assumptions that 
determine migrants to be threats to national security, and they are furthered alongside 
governmental campaigns, statements, and discourse accompanying the policy that promote - to 
varying degrees - the notion that there is at least some truth to those assumptions.  
De Genova’s analysis of specticality as it pertains to the border is fundamental to the 
function of the nation-state, not only as it distinguishes insiders from outsiders, but how it allows 
the nation-state to legitimize itself before the eyes of its citizens. The state is able to reinforce its 
own legitimacy by offering to provide security to its citizens, who, it argues, would otherwise 
face immense danger at the hand of migrants.  De Genova furthers his argument in his assertion 25
25 Ibid., 51. 
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that the Border Spectacle is not simply a means of portraying the migrant as a danger to national 
security and prosperity, but a guise for ​inclusion​ - specifically, the subordinate inclusion of the 
migrant. He writes,  
 
The more that the Border Spectacle generates anti-immigrant controversy, the more that 
the veritable inclusion of those incessantly targeted for exclusion proceeds apace. The 
'inclusion' of these deportable migrants, of course, is finally devoted to the subordination 
of their labour, which can be best accomplished only to the extent that their incorporation 
is permanently beleaguered with the kinds of exclusionary and commonly racist 
campaigns that ensure that this inclusion is itself, precisely, a form of subjugation.   26
 
Accoridng to De Genova, the scene of exclusion that the Border Spectacle creates is, in 
fact, a guise for the inclusion of migrants as means of subordinating their labor. Thus, the 
migrant once again bridges the divide between inclusion and exclusion, feeding the scene of 
exclusion created by the Border Spectacle while truly facing inclusion on the basis of 
subjugation. While I do not entirely concur with the notion that the purpose of the migrant’s 
covert inclusion is ​only​ to exploit their labor, I believe that De Genova and Campbell have both 
demonstrated an indisputable truth about foreign policy and the hazardization of the migrant: the 
nation-state is not attempting to eliminate the threat the migrant poses through its foreign policy. 
Instead, it aims to disseminate discursive elements that, in the words of Campbell, are required 
by the nation-state to “provide a new theology of truth about who and what ‘we’ are by 
highlighting who or what ‘we’ are not, and what ‘we’ have to fear.”  The migrant is indelibly a 27
key to the self-production of the nation-state’s identity: the nation necessitates the migrant’s 
externality to reinforce the citizen’s internality. The hazard of the migrant, which foreign policy 
26 De Genova, “Spectacles of MIgrant ‘Illegality.” 
27 Ibid., 48. 
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consistently demonstrates, is not a threat to the nation-state’s security or prosperity: rather, it is 
the thing on which a nation-state’s identity is conditional. Without the promise of danger offered 
by the migrant, the nation-state would be unable to provide a scene of exclusion that both 
redefines the inclusion/exclusion binary for its citizen while also muting the migrant’s inclusive 
exclusion. Ultimately, in order for the state to be secure, it must simultaneously and categorically 
be insecure. 
 
A Necessary Threat 
The insecurity posed by the migrant provides a necessary ground for promotion of the 
inclusion/exclusion binary and the masking of inclusive exclusion, and truly begins to reveal 
how vital the migrant is to the mechanics of the nation-state. Fundamentally, it is the 
nation-state’s own identity to which the migrant is essential - as are the borders that define 
international migration between nation-states. Campbell writes, “Were there no borders, there 
would be no danger, but such a condition is at odds with the logic of identity, for the condition of 
possibility for experience entails (at least to some extent) the disciplining of ambiguity, the 
containment of contingency, and the delineation of borders.”  What Campbell highlights here is 28
the necessity of borders - not as means of preventing danger, but of generating it. His central 
argument​ ​proposes that foreign policy is a political practice vital to the production and 
maintenance of American political identity: 
 
...this argument proposes that United States foreign policy be understood as a political 
practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of American political 
identity. In order to delineate more precisely the relationship between foreign policy and 
28 Ibid., 81. 
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political identity, this argument is predicated on a reconceptualization of understandings 
to which the conventional view of international relations and foreign policy is deeply 
indebted - most specifically, a reconceptualization of identity and the state.  29
 
 
While Campbell focuses largely on the self-legitimation process that is facilitated when 
the state is able to enact foreign policy and make a promise of security to its citizens. 
Furthermore, I wish to observe the dire consequences such policy has for not  
foreigners, but migrants. I argue that it is not only the false discourses of danger, promulgated by 
the sovereign government, that is required in national identity-making. The true threat the 
migrant poses - that which challenges the logic of national sovereignty and identity-making 
through the ambiguity and abnormality of the migrant’s membership status - is crucial to the 
dynamic process of producing and maintaining the sovereignty of the nation-state. As the 
national citizen requires the foreigner, against whom they may forge their identity, the 
nation-state requires the migrant - whom they do not forge their identity against, but ​with. ​The 
migrant’s lack of belonging and national representation, coupled with their relation to 
border-crossing, may challenge the logic of national sovereignty, yet it also provides the 
nation-state with an integral piece to the political machine of identity-building, without which, 
the political machine would be unable to function. That piece is the migrant, from whom the 
nation-state may promise its citizens protection, but also, who will ultimately serve as the target 
of the violence, exploitation, and erasure necessary in fulfilling that promise. I argue that it is the 
fulfillment of the promise of protection to its citizens that legitimizes the nation-state, and that 
such a promise is not fulfilled by the enacting of anti-migrant policy, but the brutal subjugation 
sanctioned and implemented by that policy. Paradoxically, if a nation-state wishes to be secure it 
29 Ibid., 9. 
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must also be insecure, requiring a threat that is both immanent and external in order to forge a 
relationship in which the citizen feels dependent on their nation to provide safety and security. In 
doing so, the nation-state may at last find its legitimation and fortification.  
In what follows, I will demonstrate that the border, emphasized as a barrier between 
citizen and foreigner, is intended to conceal the actual function of national boundaries. The 
border is truly a processing agent, which exploits both the migrant’s lack of state representation 
as well as their relation to border-crossing, in order to forcibly depoliticize them and expose 
them to sovereign violence - rendering them as existing in a semi-permanent state of 
inclusive-exclusion and bare life. Agamben refers to this state of being as the state of exception:  
 
“...the sovereign exception is the fundamental localization (​Ortung​), which does not limit 
itself to distinguishing what is inside from what is outside but instead traces a threshold 
(the state of exception) between the two, on the basis of which outside and inside, the 
normal situation and chaos, enter into those complex topological relations that make the 
validity of the juridical order possible...​The exception is what cannot be included in the 




Excluded from citizenship in the nation whose borders the migrant intends, attempts, and 
succeeds in crossing, they are also included by way of subjection to that nation’s laws. However, 
in lacking political life, or citizenship, the migrant is rendered defenseless against sovereign 
violence. This violence - sanctioned by policy that is inherently necropolitical - contributes to the 
inevitable disenfranchisement and erasure undergone by migrants, who have little choice other 
than to become less visible than the average citizen or remain exposed to the very sovereign that 
30 Agamben, ​Homo Sacer, ​25. 
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imparts violence upon them. Meanwhile, the spectacle of the militarized physical border, as well 
as the discourse on unauthorized migrants and the danger they pose, render migrants selectively 
visible on the part of the nation-state. Having subdued and subjugated the migrant, the sovereign 
government is able to decide how, when, and where the migrant and the issues that surround 
them become visible to the public eye. The nation’s control over the public image of the migrant 
primarily allows false discourses of danger to be easily disseminated amongst the citizenry. 
Subsequently, the widespread erasure of the migrant, who may have been imprisoned, killed, or 
exploited, misleads the citizen to believe that the government has successfully staved the 
impending waves of migrants at the border. In this, the nation-state has fulfilled the promise of 
security that it offered its citizens, protecting them from the supposedly imminent threat of the 
migrant.  However, as Campbell notes, this process of promise and fulfillment is unending:  
 
In other words, states are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of 
identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the 




Effectively, the nation-state is caught in a never-ending cycle of identity-production, 
ceaselessly engaging in the manufacturing of a threat from which it may offer to protect its 
citizens in an unyielding quest for legitimacy. Were the nation-state to cease this cycle of 
production, it would run the risk of a foundational collapse, as national sovereignty depends on 
the citizenry’s belief in its own legitimacy and the concealment of its constructed nature. The 
logic of the stateless person may innately be at odds with the logic of statehood, as it destabilizes 
31 Campbell, ​Writing Security​, 12. 
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the key principle of inclusion and exclusion upon which the nation-state is grounded; however, 
that destabilization may be redirected into characterizing the migrant as a false threat to national 
security and prosperity, ultimately serving the dual purpose of quelling the threat to legitimacy 
and reinforcing the national identity. This process is only aided by the migrant’s purgatorial state 
of being; their inclusive-exclusion places them beyond the conventional logic of statehood and 
thus affords them protection against the violent exploitation and subordination foisted upon them 
by the state. The migrant’s ambiguity and abnormality within a nationalized world renders them 
the ideal target for this process, laying them bare to the violent manipulation employed by the 
nation-state as means of reinforcing its own sovereignty.   
27 
Chapter 2: The Border 
Sovereign Violence and the Production of Sacred Life 
 
I now aim to provide an in-depth analysis of national borders and their role in the fortification of 
the nation-state. Primarily, I urge readers to keep in mind that no two borders are the same. They 
are shaped, securitized, and perceived according to a vast array of social, political, and economic 
dynamics that are unique to the societies that surround them. The process of bordering that I 
describe in this chapter likely applies to different national borders to vastly different degrees and, 
similarly, manifests in a variety of ways pertaining to unique national and cultural dynamics. 
That being said, I believe that such a process finds the most strength among the dynamics of 
global hegemony and historic colonization that thrive at borders separating the so-called “Global 
North” from the “Global South.” The following chapter will consist of three parts: first, I will 
discuss the conventional wisdom that surrounds the territorially-bound national border and 
destabilize it, examining borders as not a spatial entity but an aphysical one that serves as a 
condition of being rather than a boundary. In the next section, I will consider how this fact 
illuminates a process of rendering undergone by migrants who cross national borders, subverting 
the perceived binary of citizenship. In the third and final section, I analyze how such a process 
contributes to the erasure and exploitation of the migrant for the purpose of sovereign 
self-reproduction. Ultimately, I intend to illustrate the national border not as a barrier that 
distinguishes insider from outsider, but as a boundless and exploitative rendering process that 






The conventional premise of the national border maintains a territorial and spatial 
indication, as it supposedly refers to the boundary that sits between one nation-state and the next. 
This conventional perception of a national border perpetuates the notion that the border is a 
barrier between insider and outsider, and the spectacle of militarization that often occurs at 
national borders only reinforces this impression. However, border politics and policing may be 
traced far beyond the border and even beyond the borderlands, materializing along the complex 
dynamics of deportations, detentions, raids, and the importation of (often unauthorized) migrant 
labor. In order for the border spectacle - which that characterizes the border as a boundary of 
protection between insiders and outsiders - to be maintained, then, the state must rely on the 
making of those complex internal dynamics as banal.  
Shahram Khosravi’s ​Illegal Traveler ​is an exploration of statelessness, as the author uses 
his own experiences as a stateless person to craft a unique “auto-ethnography” of national 
borders and the violence imposed upon him as a border-crosser. “Banality,” he states, “is always 
a crucial feature of political brutality.”  The term “banal” is defined as such a total lack of 32
originality as to actually be trite and obvious, indicating a kind of commonness or ordinary 
quality about the thing deemed “banal.” Khosravi here suggests that political brutality requires 
banality to function, depending on its own profusion to effectively desensitize a population into 
regarding that specific violence as commonplace and largely insignificant. De Genova too 
discusses banality in his assessment of the Border Spectacle, arguing,  
32 Shahram Khosravi, ​‘Illegal Traveler’: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders ​(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 
82. 
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...the ever-increasingly militarized spectacle of apprehensions, raids, detentions and 
deportations always accompanies the banality of a continuous importation of 
'unauthorized' migrant labour. All non-citizens, inasmuch as they are construed as such 
(whether as migrants or asylum seekers), are overtly figured in one or another juridical 
relation to the authority of a territorially defined ('national') state.   33
 
Interestingly, De Genova demonstrates here how one aspect of the national border - 
securitization - can be emphasized as anomalous in order to further banalize another aspect - 
importation of labor. Khosravi and De Genova’s consideration of banality carefully exposes a 
legacy of normalization that is instrumental in the production of border politics and sovereign 
violence. Furthermore, the banality of border politics reveals something else: before I attempt to 
deconstruct border and its operation within the modern nation-state, I must first explore the 
political production of its supposed “banality,” deconstructing the standard perception of what a 
national border actually is and considering the boundary-like quality borders are presupposed as 




The conventional wisdom surrounding this question indicates that national borders are 
semi-tangible sutures that emerge where one country meets another, functioning as the boundary 
between the citizens of one nation and the next. While the boundary itself may not be physical, it 
can be distinguished by a number of material factors: at some borders there may be barbed-wire 
fences, walls, checkpoints, or officers; at others, nothing but the natural elements that long 
preceded the nation-state’s existence, unfettered by man-made structures of inclusion and 
33 De Genova, “Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality.” 
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exclusion but still exemplifying boundary-ness, such as bodies of water or deserts. The territories 
across which those borders transverse may be referred to as “borderlands,” and, in some 
circumstances, communities on either side of a border function as one, unbridled by national 
constraints. All that I have just described indicates that the border is innately physically 
localized; that there is an ingrained situational element to borders wherein they only occur as one 
nation-state meets the next. This is due, in part, to the question I posed. To ask “where is the 
border?” assumes that the border exists in certain places and not in others - a notion that is only 
reinforced by the Border Spectacle.  
In revisiting De Genova’s concept of the Border Spectacle, I intend to examine how it 
functions through the dissemination of highly-public discourse and imagery that strengthen the 
public perception of the border as a dangerous boundary, which the government must securitize 
through heightened militarization and advanced technology (such as drones and motion sensors.)
 Through various discursive practices, border securitization is touted as a virtuous measure 34
intended to protect the innocent citizens within from the migrants without, who would otherwise 
threaten national safety and prosperity through practices such as drug trade, violent crime, and 
cultural degradation. Still, the narrative that ​all​ migrants are inherently dangerous is unlikely to 
convince every citizen of a single nation-state. Those citizens who feel compassion for 
asylum-seekers, particularly those with knowledge of any persecution and strife that motivated 
their journey, are likely to believe refugees should be allowed passage past the border in search 
of a better life. Here lies an alternative method of the Border Spectacle: the promotion of border 
enforcement strategies as though they are benevolent towards not just citizens, but migrants too. 
34 ​Jason De León and Michael Wells, ​The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail​ (Oakland, 
California: University of California Press, 2015) 101. 
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A compelling example of this is the discourse surrounding human smuggling and trafficking  35
pertaining to the border. Reece Jones argues that border securitization practices are often 
portrayed as righteous initiatives “that can protect innocent migrants from unscrupulous human 
traffickers who have a wanton disregard for the lives of their human cargo.”  As migration is 36
criminalized, smugglers provide a useful scapegoat, depicted in the media and by government 
officials as violent purveyors of migrant death.  Khosravi maintains that this is not always the 37
case, providing as an example that the vast majority of migrant deaths (usually by drowning) in 
the sea along Spanish-African borders happen as a result of interception practices employed by 
Spanish immigration authorities.  Nevertheless, this discourse of humanitarianism works to 38
remedy the concerns of citizens who find themselves concerned about the fate of “good” 
migrants, “refugees” as opposed to drug dealers and violent criminals. In the same vein, one 
could even argue that the asylum process is itself an integral proponent of the Border Spectacle, 
widely considered to be an exclusive path to citizenship for those who “deserve” it; while, in 
truth, leaving vast numbers of migrants behind in times of crisis. The myth of border 
securitization as an act of benevolence towards migrants eases the conscience of citizens while 
also fostering a paternalistic narrative: one that illustrates an idealistic portrait of the nation-state, 
extending a generous hand to the helpless, needy migrant.  
The Border Spectacle, then, functions to promote the image of a border as a sort of 
physical boundary, that (to varying degrees of efficacy) stops dangerous migrants in their tracks 
35 Smuggling and trafficking are two terms that are often conflated and used interchangeably, although they are not 
the same. “Human smuggling is recurrently misrepresented by the media and politicians as an entirely 
‘mafia’-controlled criminality, but this is not the case.” Khosravi 21 
36 ​Reece Jones, ​Violent Borders ​(New York: Verso, 2016) 4. 
37 Khosravi, ​Illegal Traveler, ​26. 
38 ​ Ibid., 26. 
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while ushering in “deserving” migrants. The understanding of the border as a purely physical 
entity, as emphasized by the Border Spectacle, contributes to the perception of national borders 
as inherently bounded and localized at a specific geographical point. While a national border is 
most widely understood to be located at the juncture of two nation-states, De Genova describes 
border spaces to be a far more “variegated spectrum,” encompassing points of entry within 
nations, such as airports - where migrants undergo inspection by authorities and are issued 
documents which may be issued and violated, such as visas.  He concludes,  
...it is not any specific constellation of enforcement practices (such as the admittedly 
more sensational militarized patrols of land and sea frontiers) that constitute the 
conditions of possibility for the spectacle of immigration enforcement at 'the' border, so 
much as the mere fact that borders are indeed enacted (and thus performed) through such 
practices.  39
 
De Genova is highlighting a crucial truth about national borders: they are not an inevitable seam 
between one country and another, but an aphysical dimension produced through a series of 
practices perpetuated by border politics and policing. While it is true that the territoriality 
appropriated to national borders, through law and through discourse, make real an element of 
physicality that I do not wish to take for granted in this discussion of borders, border policing is 
carried out far beyond borders and borderlands, as is the resulting social impact. The aphysical 
border is ultimately invoked through a series of such practices that presuppose a person’s lack of 
political belonging. These practices may be employed at any place and time within the nation 
state, not just at the convergence of two nation-states, and they reveal the true fundamental 
localization of national borders: the border is not located in regards to territory, as they are not 
39 De Genova, “Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality.” 
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positioned physically; rather, borders are located politically, at the intersection of sovereignty 
and statelessness. 
Regarding borders, Khosravi writes, “Borders symbolize the sovereignty of states. A 
nation-state can be imagined (Anderson 1983) only through its borders. The nationstate system is 
based on the functional nexus between a determinate localization (territory) and a determinate 
order (the state).”  Borders, as a lens through which the territoriality of the nation-state system 40
may be illuminated, seem to serve a purpose of delineating where the agents of sovereignty may 
righteously operate. However, too often this image of national borders as a tool of definition 
allow borders to be perceived as a hollow outline, within which an order of sovereignty operates. 
In fact, the interiority of the nation-state in its entirety is precisely where borders are ever-present 
and capable of being enacted - without regard to the proximity to neighboring nations. According 
to De Genova,  
To the extent that the entirety of the interior of the space of the state becomes a 
regulatory zone of immigration enforcement, and as borders appear to be increasingly 
ungrounded – both internalized and externalized – the efficacy of the Border Spectacle in 
fact is merely intensified. As the border is effectively everywhere, so also is the spectacle 
of its enforcement and therefore its violation, rendering migrant 'illegality' ever more 
unsettlingly ubiquitous.  41
 
 What De Genova articulates here is the correspondence between a migrant’s inclusive exclusion 
and the positionality of the national border: migrant ‘illegality’ provides the scene for the 
inevitable inflation of the border - an inflation that renders a border so boundless that it becomes 
invisible. Khosravi discusses this invisibility:  
Through ‘inclusive exclusion’ (Agamben 1998:17), undesirable people – ‘illegal’ 
migrants, refugees and quasi-citizens – are positioned on the threshold between in and 
40 Khosravi, ​Illegal Traveler, ​2. 
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out. Their experience is indistinct from the operation of the nation-state and their very 
existence is indistinct from the border (Raj 2006). By rebordering politics, the sovereign 
power does not merely exclude undesirable people, but penalizes and regulates them, by 
immobilizing them in detention centres, by ignominious and terrifying threats of 
deportation, or by racialized internal border control – all of which turns the citizen into a 
quasi-citizen. As Balibar puts it, ‘some borders are no longer situated at the borders at all’ 
in the geographical or political sense of the term (2002:84). Borders have become 
invisible borders, situated everywhere and nowhere. Hence, undesirable people are not 
expelled by the border, they are forced to be border (ibid).  42
 
The United States serves as a fine example of “rebordering politics”: While the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. constitution protects people from random stops and searches, the federal 
government claims the power to conduct certain kinds of warrantless stops a “reasonable 
distance” from the border - 100 air miles from any external boundary in the U.S.. Two thirds of 
the U.S. population is located in this 100-mile zone, as are most of the largest cities in the 
country, including New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 
agents carry out certain tasks that demonstrate the exceptionality of the region from the Fourth 
Amendment, including the operation of checkpoints on major highways and secondary roads, at 
which every motorist is stopped and asked for their immigration status. CBP is also charged with 
conducting roving patrols and public transit inspections in this 100-mile zone, and, for those 
questioned, the only legal protection from detention is a vague principle that states a person may 
not be detained without “reasonable suspicion.”  While the purpose of CBP is to patrol borders 43
and the territory 100 miles inward of the border, the purpose of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) is mainly to operate where CBP is not - that is to say, throughout the 
interiority of the country. Some of the operations of ICE include workplace raids, apprehensions 
42 Khosravi, ​Illegal Traveler, ​2. 
43 “Know Your Rights: 100 Mile Border Zone.” ​ACLU.  
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of unauthorized migrants, and migrant detention. General police officers may also question a 
person’s legal status, meaning the migrant is at risk of deportation or detention if they are 
approached by officers even during day-to-day activities, such as driving or walking. 
The border and immigration policy of the United States is only one example of 
rebordering politics, but it serves as a powerful testimony to the omnipresence of the border 
throughout the interiority of the nation state. When a migrant crosses a national border, they are 
entering into a space where they remain subject to the border securitization - revealing that the 
border is not physically localized, but carried ​with ​the migrant and conjured as the sovereignty of 
the nation-state contends with the migrant’s own statelessness. The ambiguity of statelessness 
casts into question the entirety of national logic, threatening to expose its constructedness; the 
nation-state, in response, invokes the border to mitigate that threat. As I have emphasized, 
however, the nation-state does not wish to simply eliminate the threat of the migrant. Instead, I 
argue that the state weaponizes the border’s optimal function: as a rendering agent that forcibly 
depoliticizes the migrant, ultimately exposing them to the forces of sovereign violence. 
 
Homo Sacer​ and the Border Rendering Process 
 
Intersectional Identities and the Border 
Reflecting on his own experiences and the experiences of others, Khosravi asserts, 
“Migrants pay the price of rebordering and debordering policies: they are sacrificed in the ritual 
of renegotiating the borders.”  His emphasis on the sacrificial provides a compelling foundation 44
44 Khosravi, ​Illegal Traveler, ​81. 
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upon which I may question the true function of the national border - not as a boundary, but an 
inescapable and exploitative rendering process that transforms migrants into politically 
serviceable bodies for the nation state. I have established how the border is inescapable insofar as 
a migrant’s relation to border-crossing subjects them (and those who hope to aid their journey) to 
the “illegality” imposed upon them by the state. I will now address how the national border relies 
on the exploitation of preexisting inequities that are racial, cultural, sexual, gendered, and 
economic in order to forcibly depoliticize the migrant and reduce them to a state of bare life.  
According to Khosravi, “...borders regulate movements of people. While a small category 
of people enjoy unrestricted mobility rights, most people are caught within borders. The 
regulation of mobility operates through social sorting that involves sexual, gender, racial and 
class inequalities.”  He first points to Eurocentric global hegemony in order to detail the 45
racialization of borders, noting the importance of having “the ability to translate one’s life story 
into Eurocentric juridical language and to perform the role expected of the refugee” in order to 
successfully obtain refugee status. He references an experience of his own, in which he and 
others were advised to wear dirty clothes to their UNHCR interview in order to appear “sad” and 
“profound.”  Racial divisions are especially pronounced at the borders that define the so called 46
“Global North” from the “Global South” - for instance, the Mediterranean EU border, which has 
been increasingly subject to crossings by African and Middle Eastern migrants since the 2010s; 
or the Southwestern U.S. border, which also hosts a vast number of migrants from Mexico and 
Central American countries such as Honduras and El Salvador. These borders, two of the 
deadliest in the world,  and the movement surrounding them are particularly subject to the 47
45 Ibid.,​ ​2. 
46 Ibid., 34. 
47 Jones, “Violent Borders,” 5. 
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emergence of racialized discourse that, owing to the perceived racial and cultural differences 
between the “insiders” and the “outsiders,” further fosters the dehumanization of the migrant. As 
the racial and/or cultural background of migrants comes into question alongside this 
conventional discourse, rhetoric that portrays them as threatening or disadvantageous is only 
emboldened. Racialized discourse regarding migrants also contributes to the rhetoric of 
deservedness as it is applied to the migrant, determining who “deserves” status such as refugee 
status, and, inevitably, who “deserves” to migrate away from persecution, economic strife, and 
other factors that produce migration - as with Khosravi’s example, he would be perceived as 
more deserving of asylum status were he to conform to standards of what a refugee from the 
Middle East should look like according to ill-informed Eurocentric standards. 
As they are racialized, borders are similarly gendered and sexualized. Khosravi details 
how sexual assault is linked to border crossing, writing,  
One sexual aspect of borders is the rape of border crossers. Women and, to a lesser 
extent, men run the risk of being raped not only by bandits and smugglers but also by 
border guards. Rape at borders is systematic, occurs routinely and follows a similar 
pattern along borders in different places. Rape has become a mechanism of border 
control.   48
 
Sexual violation in regards to borders is, in some ways, different from sexual assault in war or in 
prison, Khosravi argues, as it functions not necessarily or independently as means of punishing 
or defeating the enemy but more so as a “tariff” - highlighting how women are often raped by 
border guards as a price for safe passage (specifically referring to this practice as it occurs at the 
U.S.-Mexico Border).  He adds that authorities are unlikely to hold these rapists accountable, 49
which reveals a patriarchal quality of the nation state as it is based in conflating militarization, 
48 Khosravi, ​Illegal Traveler, ​40. 
49 Ibid., 40. 
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masculinity, and securitization.  He also notes the risks faced by migrants who are not 50
heterosexual or cisgender face a higher risk for violence and discrimination by smugglers, 
bandits, border guards, and asylum interviewers.  51
The national border also facilitates economic exploitation and discrimination of migrants. 
Khosravi notes that unauthorized migrants are likely to be robbed, not only by bandits but by 
border agents before they are taken into custody. Even authorized migrants, adds Khosravi, are 
subject to robbing and bribery - if the migrant fails to comply, they could be arrested.  “Public 52
charge” policy is also grounded on the basis of economic discrimination and again facilitates the 
rhetoric of “deservedness” - citing economic security claims to disqualify migrants from 
inclusion based on their own prosperity, and contending that migrants who do not breach a 
certain threshold of wealth will provide an unfair burden on the state’s welfare system. 
The exploitation of the migrant is intersectional, and I aim to draw upon this fact to 
emphasize that there is​ no singular migrant experience.​ Any attempt to dissect broad social 
dynamics, such as my attempt here with border politics and migrant exploitation, is inherently 
homogenizing to some degree as it presupposes a shared experience between a vast number of 
individuals. Therefore, I feel it important to simultaneously highlight the hazard of 
homogenization - not only in that it reduces the experiences of individuals to such a degree that 
may be both dehumanizing and dismissive of their agency, but also in that to homogenize such a 
great quantity of experiences underestimates the powerful mechanics at work within the border’s 
true function. The exploitation a migrant may face during or after they cross a border is highly 
and intentionally individualized. The subordination imposed on migrants by border politics relies 
50 Ibid., 41. 
51 Ibid., 41. 
52 Ibid., 19. 
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upon existing discourse, whether it be racialized, sexualized, economized, or other. It is for this 
reason that the bordering process is so difficult to see and understand: it doesn’t exist on its own, 
but grounds itself in preexisting discourse to allow for maximum efficacy. This rendering 
process is indeed so powerful because it adapts to strategically wield existing prejudice and 
inequity, allowing the state to shift the migrant’s own narrative in a way that serves national 
interests - for example, in one instance using an image of a hardened adult male’s mugshot to 
demonstrate the necessity of border securitization against criminals, and in the next using the 
image of a downtrodden little girl to demonstrate the benevolence of the state as it provides 
asylum status.  
The implications of such images fuel a powerful discursive dynamic within the 
nation-state, and other implications that are far more subtle can be found even in everyday 
language. Khrosavi also addresses the “animalization” of the terminology used to discuss 
migration, which often designates animal names to migrants and even smugglers. These terms 
include names such as the Spanish ​pollos ​(chickens) for Mexican border crossers and ​coyote​ for 
the smuggler; the Iranian ​gosfand ​(sheep) for “illegal” border crossers; and ​renshe ​(human 
snakes) for smuggled Chinese people and ​shetou​ (snakehead) for Chinese smugglers.  He 53
concludes, “Dehumanized and represented in terms of chicken and sheep – two animals 
traditionally sacrificed in rituals – the border transgressors are sacrificial creatures for the border 
ritual.”  The element of “sacrifice” that Khosravi repeatedly mentions is truly vital to an 54
understanding of how the border, in its ubiquitousness and exploitativeness, functions efficiently 
53 Ibid., 27. 
54 Ibid., 27. 
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and brutally to transform the migrant into exactly what the nation-states requires it to be: a ​homo 
sacer. 
Homo Sacer 
To understand what constitutes the ​homo sacer, ​it is necessary to first understand the 
distinction between “bare life” and “good life” as provided by Agamben in ​Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life. ​He contends that law has always claimed the authority to 
distinguish “bare life” from “good life” - essentially distinguishing biological life, or bodies, 
from political life, or citizenship. By assuming the authority to make this exclusive distinction, 
the law makes bare life the subject of its political control. Building on the works of Carl Schmitt, 
Agamben draws upon the concept of a “state of exception,” a condition in which law is 
suspended by the sovereign. Agamben identifies the state of exception as having become the 
norm in contemporary politics through the unfettered use of practices such as emergency powers 
and martial law, leaving the law in practice but with no substantial meaning. He explains, 
The sovereign exception is the presupposition of the juridical reference in the form of its 
suspension.​ Inscribed as the presupposed exception in every rule that orders or forbids 
something (for example, in the rule that forbids homicide) is the pure and unsanctionable 
figure of the offense, that, in the normal case, brings about the rule’s own transgression 
(in the same example, the killing of a man not as natural violence but as sovereign 
violence in the state of exception.)  55
 
Agamben concludes that bare life is caught in a particular relation to sovereign power known as 
“the sovereign ban.” The condition of abandonment occurs as those who exist within the state of 
exception cannot be liberated from sovereign rule; through its own exclusion, the law applies in 
no longer applying - the subject is both turned over to the law and abandoned by it. In order to 
55 Agamben, ​Homo Sacer, ​21. 
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illustrate this state of dual inclusion and abandonment, Agamben references a figure of Roman 
law known as the ​homo sacer. ​Under the laws of the Roman Empire, a man who committed a 
particular kind of crime had his citizenship revoked and was thereby forcibly reduced to only his 
bare life. In this, he became a ​homo sacer, ​or “sacred man,” whose life was deemed “sacred”  so 56
he could not be sacrificed in a ritual ceremony, but in his lack of citizenship or political life, 
could be killed by anybody with impunity.  Agamben explains the ​homo sacer ​as such:  57
The sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not 
permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide; 
in the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that ‘if someone kills the one who is sacred 
according to the plebiscite, it will not be considered homicide.’ This is why it is 
customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred.   58
 
Further, he adds,  
Just as the law, in the sovereign exception, applies to the exceptional case in no longer 
applying and in withdrawing from it, so ​homo sacer​ belongs to God in the form of 
unsacrificeability and is included in the community in the form of being able to be killed. 
Life that cannot be sacrificed and yet may be killed is sacred life.  59
 
The ​homo sacer, ​Agamben argues, is the the foundation upon which modern democracy 
has drawn from classical politics and developed itself: the first tenet of political life is life that 
may be killed.  It is not just the simple fact of life, Agamben claims, but life exposed to death 60
(as bare life is exposed to death as a sacred man) that is the originary political element: “The 
banishment of sacred life is the sovereign ​nomos​ that conditions every rule, the originary 
56 In this context, “sacred” does not so much take on the traditional definition of being a venerated figure connected 
to God. Rather, it indicates the status of a person taken outside both secular and divine law as an exception and is 
thereby abandoned by them. 
57 Ibid., 71. 
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spatialization that governs and makes possible every localization and every territorialization.”  61
He concludes, “The very body of ​homo sacer ​is, in its capacity to be killed but not sacrificed, a 
living pledge to his subjection to the power of death.”  The ​homo sacer​ represents the inclusive 62
exclusion of natural life and it is upon the inclusive exclusion of particular bodies that sovereign 
violence is founded. Therefore, it is life, exposed to death, in regards to which sovereign 
violence is generated.  According to Agamben, the concentration camp is the most salient 63
manifestation of sovereign power, as the place in which bare life is most brazenly seized by the 
state. In the concentration camp, Agamben argues, a space emerges where the state of exception 
becomes the rule and, as such, law and life become indistinguishable. He references the fact that, 
in Nazi Germany, Jews could be sent to the extermination camps ​only after​ they had been fully 
denationalized and stripped of citizenship.   64
Necropolitics 
I argue, then, that the primary function of the national border is to forcibly reduce the 
migrant to a state of bare life, rendering them a ​homo sacer. ​The conversion of the migrant to a 
homo sacer​ is achieved through their relation to the border; this relation, working in conjunction 
with the structural inequities it exploits as well as the “illegality” surrounding migration, 
effectively extracts the migrant from their political life. In doing so, the migrant is placed in a 
semi-permanent, selective state of exception, leaving them fully exposed to forces of sovereign 
violence. This sovereign violence, carried out through numerous direct and indirect apparati of 
the state, is a manifestation of what is termed “necropolitics” - defined as the sovereign 
61 Ibid., 111. 
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instrumentalization of death. In the end, the chief function of the border is to exploit and 
subordinate the migrant through necropolitical means, ultimately serving the state’s cyclical 
process of self-legitimation. 
The originary political element being not life, but life exposed to death, indicates a 
necropolitical landscape upon which modern sovereignty is founded. Necropolitics, a concept 
first explored in depth by Achille Mbembe, accounts for the killing of individuals by a sovereign 
body, not insofar as they are guilty of committing any sort of crime, but as they are groups whose 
deaths are perceived to benefit the remaining populations.  In the words of Khosravi, “The 65
modern nation-state has claimed the right to preside over the distinction between useful 
(legitimate) and wasted (illegitimate) lives (Bauman 2004:33).”  The practice of necropolitics is 66
not simply the practice of killing, but the practice of exposing others to death; the practice of 
deciding who can live and who must die. “To kill or to allow to live,” argues Mbembe, 
“constitute the limits of sovereignty, its fundamental attributes. To exercise sovereignty is to 
exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power.”
 In order to demonstrate the employment necropolitics in all its forms, Mbembe draws on 67
“topographies of cruelty” such as the colony and the plantation, referencing historical instances 
such as aparthied in South Africa, chattel slavery, war, suicide bombings, and the colonization of 
65 The concept of necropolitics is often discussed alongside Foucalt’s concept of biopower. According to Foucalt, 
biopower is a practice of the modern nation-state in managing and regulating their subjects; it is quite literally the 
nation’s power over its subjects bodies. While biopower might be defined as having power over life, necropolitics 
may conversely be defined as having power over death. Biopower, in its concern with regulating whole populations, 
might entail necropolitics in killing members of that population, but Mbembe critiqued biopower’s conflation of 
racism, murder, and war to the point of indistinguishability. According to Mbembe, this conflation renders biopower 
as less effective in communicating the sovereign’s employment of death as political power.(De León 66)  
66 Khosravi, ​Illegal Traveler,​ 3. 
67 Achille Mbembe, J.-A., and Libby Meintjes, "Necropolitics," ​Public Culture​ 15, no. 1 (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003) 12. 
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Palestine. He includes stateless people in refugee camps, alongside the settlement of new 
colonies and mass expulsions, among the practices that are “underwritten by the sacred terror of 
truth and exclusivity.”  Like Agamben, Mbembe cites the state of exception and declares that it 68
is the normative basis of the right to kill, writing,  
 
In such instances, power (and not necessarily state power) continuously refers and 
appeals to exception, emergency, and a fictionalized notion of the enemy. It also labors to 
produce that same exception, emergency, and fictionalized enemy. In other words, the 
question is: What is the relationship between politics and death in those systems that can 
function only in a state of emergency?   69
 
Politics, concludes Mbembe, is death living a human life, and as such, sovereignty is the 
right to the hazardization of that life.  Reasoning that sovereignty is expressed primarily as the 70
right to kill, Mbembe adds, “My concern is those figures of sovereignty whose central project is 
not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the 
material destruction of human bodies and populations.”  Inspired by Mbembe’s compelling 71
analysis of sovereignty and death, I would only object that the instrumentalization of human 
existence and destruction of bodies to which he speaks is, in fact, inherently a matter of 
sovereign autonomy. I argue instead that the necropower of the state is weaponized against 
migrants in order to position them closer to death, effectively achieving their subjugation in a 
manner that successfully provides the basis for the reproduction of state sovereignty. 
 
The Spectrum of Citizenship 
68 Ibid., 27. 
69 Ibid., 16. 
70 Ibid., 15. 
71 Ibid., 14. 
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The Border Gaze 
The migrant, forcibly reduced to bare life​ ​and rendered a ​homo sacer ​by border politics​, 
through this process becomes fully exposed to the forces of state necropower. The system that I 
have described here is not one of aimless violence, but the cornerstone upon which national 
sovereignty is not only constructed, but reproduced over and over again. In order to demonstrate 
the migrant’s place in the national quest for sovereignty, I believe a concept Khosravi presents, 
known as the “border gaze,” is the essential starting point. “The border gaze,” he alleges, “does 
not operate through a simple function of exclusion. It situates immigrants on the ‘threshold’, 
between inside and outside...Undesirable immigrants are included without being members.” He 
then references Agamben’s analysis of exception: ‘The exception is that which cannot be 
included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it 
is always already included’ (Agamben 1998:25).”  According to Khorsravi, the border gaze is 72
cross-cutting: it is like a complex fabric, hierarchically woven to include factors of race, sex, 
gender, and class; and it is cast over a body as perception that determines the visibility of that 
body.  The bodies over which the border gaze is cast are the bodies of “undesirable migrants,” 73
and those migrants are summarily placed on a threshold, in a zone between inclusion and 
exclusion. The border gaze not only perceives migrants on the basis of their migration, but 
according to other factors of their identity, reveals the entirely intersectional nature of matters 
concerning sovereignty, nationalization, and migration.  
Khosravi observes the border gaze as it is an intersection and interaction between 
ethnicity, race, gender, and sex. For example, he concludes that women are likely to be targeted 
72 Khosravi, ​Illegal Traveler, ​76. 
73 Ibid., 77. 
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by the border according to their sexuality and men according to their religion and ethnicity.  He 74
illustrates this point by discussing how xenophobic stereotypes (gathered from figures like 
Osama Bin Laden and Sadam Hussein) allow a “primitive masculinity” to be ascribed to Muslim 
men in Sweden, contributing to the notion that Muslim men not only endanger Muslim women 
(who are similarly stereotyped as passive) but also are fundamentally at odds with “civilized” 
Western values. Perhaps, Khosravi concludes, this is why women are much more likely to 
receive asylum than men.  “The border gaze,” writes Khosravi, “through its xenophobic mode 75
of seeing, targets and imperils the lives of undesirable immigrants. ‘Border gaze’, for those 
targeted by it, is more than an abstract theoretical concept; it is a highly tangible part of everyday 
life. It is forceful and sometimes formidable and deadly.”  Khosravi’s concept of a “border 76
gaze” is gripping, as it lays the groundwork for the primary achievement of the border-rendering 
process: it is an instrument that determines a person’s positionality in terms of a national border; 
in doing so, the border gaze exposes a spectrum of membership wherein that person may qualify 
as a citizen, a quasi-citizen, and an anti-citizen. 
 
The Citizen, the Quasi-Citizen, and the Anti Citizen 
Khosravi conceived of these terms in his auto-ethnography, stating that as there are 
citizens, there are too quasi-citizens and anti-citizens. He defines the anti-citizen as follows: “In 
contrast to the ideal citizen, there is the anti-citizen, an individual who exists outside the ordinary 
regulatory system, one who violates established norms and who may constitute a risk to the 
74 Ibid., 77. 
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than men. (Khosravi 77) 
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safety and quality of life of ‘normal’ citizens.”  On unauthorized migrants in particular, he 77
claims,  
Undocumented immigrants are seen as anti-citizens because they are considered burdens 
on society. They are thought to have a negative effect on welfare and the economy (their 
only costs to society are, ironically, the costs associated with their deportation). Above 
all, they are portrayed as a ‘labour market problem’. They take jobs with low wages, 
which weakens collective agreements. In the end, they endanger the very existence of the 
welfare system (see Khosravi 2010). An anti-citizen is portrayed as a criminal, as lacking 
identity and as being irrational, irresponsible and immoral...As anti-citizens, 
undocumented immigrants are presumed to violate the ‘ethical values’ and ‘morals’ of 
citizens.  78
 
According to Khosravi, the anti-citizen is largely antithetical to the citizen, in both their 
violation of sociocultural norms and subsequent characterization as a risk to citizens’ quality of 
life, security, and prosperity. The anti-citizen is perhaps the subject of the border gaze in its most 
unadulterated form, as they have no documentation of citizenship or residency to protect them 
from deportation or detention. However, I also believe documentation is not the sole factor that 
distinguishes a person’s position on the spectrum of citizenship, and I believe this fact is best 
demonstrated not by the anti-citizen but by the quasi-citizen. 
Between the anti-citizen and the citizen, claims Khosravi, lies the quasi-citizen. The 
quasi-citizen is perhaps the most compelling representation of the liminality of the border gaze, 
situated somewhere along the spectrum of citizen and an anti-citizen - a salient product of 
inclusive exclusion. A quasi-citizen will likely have undergone some kind of reterritorialization, 
such as having attained asylum status, residency, or citizenship. Regardless of any 
documentation they might possess, the quasi-citizen retains the residual exposure that was 
77 Ibid., 116. 
78 Ibid., 116. 
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imposed upon them by their relation to border-crossing and is resultantly a target for sovereign 
violence. In fact, children of migrants who claim birthright citizenship in their country of 
residence are likely positioned as quasi-citizens rather than just citizens; by way of their parent’s 
relation to border-crossing and subsequent exploitation, the child’s life will be shaped by the 
exploitation their parent suffers and may have their citizenship cast into question - and 
destabilized - multiple times in their life. Thus, while it may be true that what distinguishes the 
anti-citizen from the quasi-citizen and the citizen is their lack of ​any​ form of state-sanctioned 
reterritorialization, I can conclude that “anti-citizen” and “quasi-citizen” are modes of existence 
not entirely determined one’s true legal status. Rather, it seems that anti-citizenship and 
quasi-citizenship are a lasting effect of the border gaze that define an individual’s relation to a 
national border. The conditions of anti- and quasi-citizenship account for a person’s legal status, 
but also elements of their background such as their class, race, lineage, and other factors. 
Khosravi determines that he is an example of a quasi-citizen, and provides a specific 
example from his own life that represents his quasi-citizen status. A migrant from Iran and 
asylum recipient, Khosravi had been a Swedish citizen for over ten years when he was 
interrogated and threatened with detention by immigration authorities in an airport while 
attempting to enter London. “My status as a Swedish citizen disappeared at the racialized border 
because of my face,” he writes, referring to the fact that the basis of the interrogation was 
racially motivated on the basis of his appearance.  Upon his refusal to answer several of the 79
officer’s questions, Khosravi was informed he could be detained for up to nine days under an act 
known as the Anti-Terrorism Act. As a result, he determined that he would rather return to 
79 Ibid., 98. 
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Sweden at once than continue attempting to enter London, but the officer stated this was not an 
option either until he had answered all of her questions. He recalls,  
Put into a petrifying immobility, I could move neither in nor out. I was indistinguishable 
from the border; I was the border. When she realized that I had decided to be detained 
rather than answer her questions about my parents, she wished me a pleasant time in 
Bristol! Suddenly, I was a full EU citizen again with a surplus of mobility rights and 
freedom of movement. My legal status as an EU citizen was apparently not fixed, but 
rather situational, conditional and unconfirmed. I am a quasi-citizen...I am included and 
at the same time excluded.  80
 
Khosravi’s “quasi-citizenship” here demonstrates an oscillation between acknowledged 
citizenship and a complete lack of membership, mobilized by his appearance as it distinguished 
him from other Swedish citizens and, also, how it defined him as a possible terrorist in the eyes 
of this officer - as he was not being detained on the suspicion of simply being an unauthorized 
citizen so much as being a possible danger to other Swedish citizens.  What is also presented in 81
Khosravi’s experience is how the condition of quasi-citizenship is one that, in fact, does the work 
of the state in that it creates a dynamic in which the Border Spectacle is allowed to play out. 
While practices of scrutinization may differ depending on the national border and the port of 
entry in question, highly visible measures often accompany such experiences, including 
questioning and frisking performed publicly before others in the area. While quasi-citizens with 
appropriate documentation are likely to be released and allowed to continue their journey, it is 
the moment in which their citizenship is publicly scrutinized and cast into uncertainty that 
contributes to a spectacle - a spectacle which reinforces the notion of the border as a severe, 
physical boundary that must be securitized. Ironically, it is the truly aphysical localization 
80 Ibid., 98. 
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between sovereignty and statelessness that renders the border so omnipresent as to produce 
quasi-citizens in the first place. 
In Khosravi’s recollection, he demonstrates that he is a both a legal citizen of Sweden but 
still qualifies as a quasi-citizen, demonstrating how an individual’s legal status does not entirely 
determine where they are positioned on the spectrum of citizenship. While an anti-citizen may be 
an unauthorized migrant, a quasi-citizen is a person who may, to varying degrees, enjoy the 
benefits of citizenship or residency but remains, also to varying degrees, on the threshold of 
inclusion and exclusion within a nation-state. A quasi-citizen could be a person with asylum 
status, like Khosravi; a permanent resident; or a citizen naturalized by other means. Not only 
does this demonstrate the long-lasting influence of the border gaze, but it also highlights the 
intersectionality of membership: a person’s appearance, economic status, lifestyle, legal status, 
native language, and other qualities are all factors that are both innately tied to migration and 
border-crossing, and also distinguish a migrant and their relatives from the citizens who surround 
them. 
Therefore, it seems citizenship is not simply a binary, and perhaps not even a ternary, as 
Khosravi’s concept of the anti-, quasi-, and full citizen demonstrate. The varying degrees to 
which someone can adopt citizenship status reveals a spectrum-like quality to national 
membership. That being said, if national membership is a gradient rather than a binary, the true 
function of citizenship becomes obscured - it is no longer simply an instrument of distinguishing 
the insider from the outsider, but an integral measure in the reproduction of sovereignty as it 
serves as an indicator of an individual’s vulnerability to sovereign violence. 
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Citizenship, as the bearer of political life or “good life” in the modern nation-state, is the 
acting polarizing force between sovereign violence and bare life. Citizenship obligates the 
nation-state to a citizen’s bare life in a manner that is nearly contractual: so long as a person 
retains citizen status, their bare life cannot be a target of sovereign violence. Even those regimes 
considered the most atrocious and immoral have often shown adherence and respect for these 
rules of membership; as Agamben noted, Jews in Nazi Germany could not be sent to death 
camps without first being fully denationalized.  Agamben’s example sheds a sinister light on 82
citizenship: the contractual quality it appears to possess in excluding a person from sovereign 
violence is not actually guaranteed - it is only a construct that may be revoked by the sovereign 
government at nearly any time. Agamben addresses the faithless nature of citizenship insofar as 
it is a defense against state violence, asserting that the increasingly-omnipresent state of 
exception casts even the full citizen into a condition of vulnerability. Meanwhile, both Khosravi 
and De León contend that even when a nation-state is not in a declarative state of emergency, 
those who remain on the threshold of inclusive exclusion of that nation likely exist in a 
semi-permanent state of exception at all times. It is the state of exception that reveals what truly 
endures: not citizenship itself, which may be withdrawn as the sovereign sees fit, but the 
determinative quality​ of citizenship. Perhaps, then, the principal operation of citizenship is to 
determine a person’s degree of exposure to sovereign necropower and violence. Citizenship can 
then be viewed as a tool of positionality, set with the task of determining an individual’s locus - 
not in relation to membership - but to death. 
 
82 Agamben, ​Homo Sacer, ​132. 
52 
Political Erasure and Exploitation 
The degree to which an individual is vulnerable to sovereign violence is largely affixed to 
their location on the spectrum of citizenry, as I will now discuss the necropolitical strategies of 
the nation-state that target quasi-citizens and anti-citizens - thereby positioning them closer to 
death. Again, it is important to note that necropower is not simply exercised through the killing 
of an individual, but oftentimes through exposing them to conditions of violence, exploitation, 
and subjugation - factors that are all likely to increase that individual’s chance of death. I will 
also address how the national production of the ​homo sacer​ contributes to the widespread 
political erasure of the migrant, and how, ultimately, this erasure is a crucial element to 
sovereign self-legitimation. 
“The gaze is not an innocent act of seeing, but an episteme determining who/what is 
visible and invisible.”  Here, Khosravi is defining a key aspect of “visibility” that the border 83
gaze is charged with commanding. Political visibility - the ability of certain groups to advocate 
for their own interests through electoral politics, protest, lawmaking, or other means - is a luxury 
afforded far more generously to “legal” citizens of a nation-state than to others. However, I 
would like to briefly destabilize the binary of “visible” and “invisible” that Khosravi establishes, 
if for no other reason than to address the fact that those communities who often have the least 
political visibility are not actually invisible at all within the modern nation-state. The 
highly-populated city tends to serve as many modern countries’ most compelling demonstration 
of heterogeneity, representing perhaps that nation’s greatest intersection and interaction of class, 
race, ethnicity, citizen status, gender, and sexual interaction. Of course, these cities are composed 
83 Khosravi, ​Illegal Traveler, ​76. 
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of different communities and neighborhoods that serve as class and cultural divides, particularly 
owing to the de facto segregation that is rampant in many modern democracies in regards to 
education, housing, and economic opportunity. However, it is highly unlikely that an individual 
living even in the most homogenous enclave of such a city would live totally unexposed to 
people of different backgrounds and communities. Thus, I am hesitant to designate migrant 
communities “invisible” to the rest of the country as it would simply be untrue - while migrant 
presence is dispersed disproportionately throughout most countries, the same can be said for 
nearly every other demographic within most modern nation-states. Additionally, to label the 
migrant community as “invisible” would be a dismissal of the perception of the people who live 
in that community, many of whom are migrants or relatives of migrants and, thus, to whom 
migrants are incredibly visible. To declare migrants “invisible” would be to overwrite their 
narratives with the narratives of more privileged voices: likely, of those people who both enjoy a 
large amount of political visibility and, owing to this, are ignorant of those who lack political 
visibility. I believe the term “erasure” is more accurate in describing the condition that Khosravi 
is articulating : the political disenfranchisement of a particular group contributing to the 
widespread neglect of that group, despite their (possibly vast) presence within the nation-state.  
The political erasure of the migrant is achieved through necropolitical means, taking 
advantage of the migrant’s inclusive exclusion as a ​homo sacer​ in order to directly and indirectly 
impose violence upon them. These measures can take on multiple different forms: some result 
directly in an individual’s death; some exploit the labor-power of an individual for economic 
gain; some immobilize an individual through detention. However, each of these measures share a 
similar conclusion. The migrant is deprived of opportunities for political visibility and 
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representation; thus, the migrant is a target of widespread political erasure. I do not mean to 
designate migrants as non-agentic; to imply that would be an unacceptable dismissal of 
individuality and empowerment that has been achieved by migrant communities in spite of the 
social, economic, and cultural measures taken against them. Rather, what the erasure of migrants 
and migrant communities enables is the nation-state’s improved ability to subordinate and 
exploit the migrant for its own gain, while simultaneously ensuring the narrative surrounding 
such exploitation and subordination remains within state control. As a result, full citizens of that 
nation-state are likely to remain largely ignorant to the exploitation of migrant bodies while often 
enjoying the benefits of that exploitation. Erasure is perhaps one of the most integral processes of 
sovereign reproduction, both supplementing the Border Spectacle, as the perception of migrant 
“invisibility” it facilitates for citizens contributes to the narrative of the border as a barrier, while 
also narrowing the pathways for political empowerment and action - suppressing the migrant 
voice even further. 
De Genova discusses this process at length, focusing specifically on the exploitation of 
migrant-labor power. He first addresses how the nation-state is able to control the narrative 
surrounding migrant subordination through his concept of the Border Spectacle, which I have 
already addressed. According to De Genova, practices of border securitization provide a 
convincing spectacle that present national borders and border policy as maintaining the primary 
goal of keeping migrants out of the interiority of the nation state. However, the scene of 
exclusion set by this spectacle simultaneously distracts from and provides for the covert 
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inclusion of the migrant - an inclusion that ultimately results in the subordination of their labor.  84
De Genova explains the efficacy of this process, writing,  
In spite of their apparent figuration as strictly politico-legal subjects, however, all 
migrants – like all human life, generally – are finally apprehensible from the standpoint 
of capital as always-already at least potentially the embodiment of labour-power, the 
commodifiable human capacity for labour. Nevertheless, within the world social order of 
capitalism, there is a systemic separation between the locus of exploitation and the means 
of direct physical coercion, a separation in other words between the 'private' sector of the 
market and the 'public' authority of law and the state. Capital's domination of labour 
requires this bifurcation of social life under the effective hegemony of a relatively 
durable distinction between the 'economic' and the 'political', whereby every state may be 
best understood to be a particularization of the global political dimension of the 
capital–labour relation.  85
 
De Genova cites the state of exception with the “extra-economic” violence of border 
policing. This kind of violence is manifest as employers are able to exploit migrant workers and 
maximize profit, while denying them basic services such as healthcare, minimum wage, safe 
working conditions, and more. Furthermore, the unauthorized migrants who disproportionately 
occupy the most dangerous and low-paid jobs in countries such as the United States (such as 
positions in the meatpacking industry) have few protections provided to them by the government. 
The specter of “illegality” accompanies them even to the workplace, where speaking out against 
labor violations risks deportation and thus makes reporting them more challenging.  The Border 86
Spectacle, explains De Genova, is mainly a distraction, providing a scene of exclusion while 
truly fostering the inclusion of migrants for the purpose of subordinating their labor. De Genova 
states,  
84 De Genova, “Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality.” 
85 Ibid. 
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Of course, this normalization [of migrant labor] occurs only after they have either 
successfully navigated the militarized obstacle course of the Border Spectacle, or passed 
quietly from a prior status of tentative or tenuous 'legality' to one of peremptorily 
disenfranchised and almost instantaneously precarious 'illegality'. But for those who can 
elude detection and evade apprehension and deportation, there awaits, as their thankless 
reward, a protracted and indefinite social condition of deportability, and its attendant 
deprivations, which will supply the distinctive qualification of their labour-power. The 
exclusionary brashness of the Border Spectacle, then, is inextricable from its 'dirty secret', 
its obscene underbelly – the real social relation of undocumented migrants to the state, 
and the public secret of their abject inclusion as 'illegal' labour.   87
 
De Genova here provides a compelling analysis of the exploitation of migrant 
labor-power through border politics, concisely demonstrating the border rendering process in one 
of its most powerful forms: the migrant, in crossing a border, does not enter into a zone that is 
borderless, but opposingly, one in which the astonishing omnipresence of border politics and 
policing remains and furthermore, allows the migrant to be exploited as labor-power. This form 
of exploitation contributes to the reproduction of sovereignty in two different ways; both 
isolating the migrant in exploitative conditions with little visibility to the public, and 
simultaneously benefiting the economy as manufacturers can keep costs low for the American 
consumer. Therefore, the migrant is both the subject of further erasure as well as a crucial source 
of labor for the very industries that are essential to a national way of life. 
However, I believe the subordination of migrant labor is not necessarily the overarching 
objective of border politics, but only a single manifestation of national necropower exerted upon 
the migrant. As De Genova qualifies, the migrant must first successfully cross a border before 
being subject to the subordinate inclusion that allows for the exploitation of their labor in the first 
place. Navigating a national border, particularly those that are highly securitized, provides a 
87 De Genova, “Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality.” 
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scene for the demonstration of necropower wherein migrants are exposed to violence in a 
number of forms. De León demonstrates how U.S. border policy weaponizes a number of 
actants, referred to as the ​hybrid collectif, ​to facilitate violence and deaths of migrants who 
attempt to cross the border through the Sonoran desert. The actants to which he refers include 
natural elements, such as wild animals, climate, and desert terrain, as well as human elements, 
such as smugglers, bandits, vigilantes, and border agents.   88
Similarly, Reece Jones details both the direct and structural violence that surrounds some 
of the world’s most deadly borders, including the Mediterranean EU border and the 
Southwestern U.S. border. He argues, “...the existence of the border itself produces the violence 
that surrounds it...the hardening of the border through new security practices is the source of the 
violence, not a response to it.”  The high death toll surrounding highly securitized borders is 89
directly linked to national border policy, particularly to those strategies that aim to “deter” 
migrants from attempting to cross national borders. According to the research of Jones and De 
León, deterrence strategies are unlikely to truly discourage migrants but instead force them to 
undertake hazardous routes due to the securitization of the safest areas of entry. Despite the 
existing evidence that such strategies are more deadly than discouraging, they are continuously 
implemented as national-borders become more securitized. The peril of navigating a securitized 
border, then, is not simply an obstacle arranged by the state to distract from the ultimate 
objective of labor exploitation. I argue that border violence is another method of political erasure 
that stands beside the subordinate inclusion of migrant labor. The violence at the national border 
further contributes to the erasure of the migrant, particularly the unauthorized migrant, as the 
88 De León, ​The Land of Open Graves,” ​43. 
89 Jones, ​Violent Borders, ​5. 
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danger of border-crossing decreases the number of individuals who can actually manage to 
surpass the border, while those who do must take certain measures to avoid deportation. As I 
mentioned earlier, these measures can result in the exploitation of the migrant down the line, 
such as in instances where employers commit labor violations with the knowledge that 
unauthorized migrants are unlikely to report them due to their fear of deportation. Additionally, 
migrants may be exploited in other ways, with fear of deportation deterring them from reporting 
crimes such as sexual assault and domestic violence.  The migrant’s increased likelihood of 90
encountering violence might be the most salient example of necropower operationalized. As the 
state employs strategies that place the migrant’s life in peril, the migrant is likely to be forced 
into isolated spaces as they attempt to avoid deportation, and their subsequent lack of visibility 
likely confirms the convention that the nation-state is effectively fulfilling its purpose: keeping 
the dangerous from entering the country through border securitization. For some, an 
understanding of how violent border policy is also reaffirms this perception, as they hold the 
belief that violence is a necessary measure to discourage migrants from attempting to cross the 
border. 
The immobilization of the migrant through detention is the third and final apparatus of 
erasure I will mention. The migrant detention center is a powerful localization of inclusive 
exclusion, existing perhaps more as a tangible representation of the state of exception than 
anywhere else. Khosravi shares the experience of a Guinean man named Lamin, who spent over 
ten years seeking asylum in various European countries and the United States before he was 
deported back to Guinea from Sweden. Lacking the proper documentation, Lamin was returned 
90 “New ACLU Report Shows Fear of Deportation Deterring Immigrants Reporting Crimes,” ​ACLU. 
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to Sweden and spent the next two years in various detention centers and even prison - all without 
having committed a crime. Khosravi writes,  
The immigration detention centre...is a pre-modern prison – nothing more than a site for 
the punishment and permanent removal of ‘wasted’ bodies. The removal system regulates 
national ‘purity’ by confining and deporting undesirable non-citizens who are seen as 
‘economically marginal and politically dangerous’ (Simon 1998:603). While prison is 
associated with ‘disciplining’ and ‘normalization’ (Foucault 1977), detention is 
associated with exposing undesirable non-citizens to abandonment or even death.  91
 
The migrant detention center is a gripping testimony to the threshold of inclusion and exclusion 
upon which migrants stand: in the detention center, the migrant is subject to the law insofar as 
they are detained without having been charged with a crime for an indefinite amount of time. 
Yet, the law is inaccessible to migrants - they are not criminals, so they have no right to due 
process.  Thus, the migrant is once again the target of erasure: detained indefinitely under the 92
law, but afforded no pathway to accessing that law. Migrants are subject to manifold danger in 
detention centers as well - depending on the center, migrants may face restricted access to basic 
needs such as toiletries, nutritional food, and medical care; sexual abuse by officers or fellow 
detainees; and exposure to harsh climates.  Furthermore, the migrant may be detained for weeks, 93
months, or even years, as was the case with Lamin - conclusively, a potent demonstration of the 
migrant’s lack of protection against sovereign power. The immobilization of the migrant in 
detention centers is yet another method of political erasure, operationalized by the nation-state in 
order to force the migrant into spaces of isolation and subordination. In the detention center, the 
migrant is the subject of the law, but to them the law is impervious - they are given little to no 
opportunity to access the law, through due process or otherwise. Such a condition is another 
91 Khosravi, ​Illegal Traveler, ​101. 
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process of erasing the migrant from the public eye, while simultaneously supplementing the 
specticality of the border. 
 
Conclusion 
The exploitation, violation, and immobilization of the migrant reduces their control over 
their own narrative while simultaneously handing that control over to the state. On the threshold 
of inclusion and exclusion, the migrant finds themselves at a disadvantage when attempting to 
combat their own subordination, as their lack of true citizenship positions them always closer to 
the necropower of the state. De Genova states,  
The law remains effectively inaccessible and impervious to the would-be migrants who 
might seek to appeal to it or challenge it. The onus of 'illegality' thus appears to rest 
strictly and exclusively with those migrants who can be purported to have violated The 
Law, as verifiable through the mundane practices of enforcement. In place of the social 
and political relation of migrants to the state, therefore, the spectacle of border 
enforcement yields up the thing-like fetish of migrant 'illegality' as a self-evident 'fact', 
generated by its own supposed act of violation.  94
 
As the migrant’s own narrative is silenced through the systemic erasure of their voice, the 
nation-state is able to claim that narrative and reappropriate it - distorting the transnational 
experience of the migrant to provide an account that ultimately serves the cyclical process of 
sovereign production. 
“Sovereign power produces migrants as excluded subjects to be dealt with violently while 
simultaneously neutralizing their ability to resist or protest.”  Here, De León illustrates the final 95
step in the production of national identity-making: the manner in which the migrant, reduced to 
94 De Genova, “Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality.” 
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bare life, is exposed to violence and concurrently delegitimized, ultimately fortifying national 
sovereignty. “The inclusion of bare life in the political realm,” Agamben writes, “constitutes the 
original—if concealed—nucleus of sovereign power. ​It can even be said that the production of a 
biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power​.”  96
The nation-state both requires and resists the migrant. The nationalized system of which 
the nation-state is an institution necessitates a dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion, wherein 
every person is included in one membership community and excluded by all others. The migrant 
innately presents a challenge to this binary, occupying a state of inclusive exclusion: they are 
subject to the sovereignty of the nation-state while simultaneously lacking membership to that 
nation through citizenship. In this challenge, the migrant threatens to expose the very fabric of 
the nation-state as constructed, destabilizing sovereign legitimacy through their own 
transnationality. Yet, the nation-state is able to weaponize the migrant’s ambiguity - not only to 
evade the threat of exposure, but to reproduce its own sovereignty. Instrumentalization of 
discourse, imagery, and policy that portrays the migrant as a threat to national security and 
prosperity creates a scene of exclusion, and citizens look to the increasing securitization as 
evidence that the national border acts as a boundary against the impending threat of the migrant. 
However, the physicality of the border is only a spectacle: the border, located nowhere but the 
abstract intersection of sovereignty and statelessness, is not actually a boundary and is not 
intended to function as one. Instead, the national border is a rendering process that strips the 
migrant of their political life, reducing them to bare life and effectively producing a ​homo sacer. 
The migrant, now an embodiment of sacred life, lacks the protection of citizenship and is thereby 
96 Agamben, ​Homo Sacer, ​6. 
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exposed to the forces of sovereign violence. Only able to occupy the space of the anti-citizen and 
the quasi-citizen, the migrant as ​homo sacer​ reveals the manner in which citizenship determines 
an individual’s locus to death - and migrants are always positioned closer to death than the full 
citizen, always a target of the necropower employed by the sovereign nation-state. Through 
necropolitical means, the migrant is exploited, violated, and subordinated to the point of political 
erasure. It is only upon this erasure that the nation-state’s identity is realized and reproduced: the 
migrant’s subordination and erasure is provided as evidence of the nation-state’s efficacy in 
protecting its own citizens. Migrants, with little political recognition, are left with few pathways 
to defend themselves from the sovereign violence of the nation-state. Citizens, captivated by the 
spectacle of , believe the distorted narrative provided to them by the nation-state: migrant deaths 
at the border are evidence of the border’s efficiency as a boundary; their internment in detention 
centers as evidence of the successful containment of an imminent threat; their exploitation in the 
workplace and its economic benefits as an economy unfettered by the danger migrants pose to 
national prosperity. Agamben determines, 
 The life caught in the sovereign ban is the life that is originarily sacred - that is, that may 
be killed but not sacrificed - and in this sense, the production of bare life is the originary 
activity of sovereignty. The sacredness of life, which is invoked today as an absolutely 
fundamental right in opposition to sovereign power, in fact originally expresses precisely 
both life’s subjection to a power over death and life’s irreparable exposure in the relation 
of abandonment.   97
 
Thus, it is the necropolitical subordination of the migrant upon which sovereignty is 
constructed over and over again; the migrant, in their statelessness, is integral to the production 
of national legitimacy, but at the same time poses perhaps the greatest risk to sovereignty. Only 
97 Agamben, ​Homo Sacer, ​84. 
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upon the migrant’s exposure to death is the citizen’s identity reaffirmed and - finally - has the 
nation-state once more realized its never-ending quest for sovereign legitimacy. Mbembe 
describes the nature of the migrant and citizen identity:  
The perception of the existence of the Other as an attempt on my life, as a mortal threat 
or absolute danger whose biophysical elimination would strengthen my potential to life 
and security—this, I suggest, is one of the many imaginaries of sovereignty characteristic 
of both early and late modernity itself...They also challenge the idea that, of necessity, the 
calculus of life passes through the death of the Other; or that sovereignty consists of the 
will and the capacity to kill in order to live.   98
 
Mbembe demonstrates here what is nothing less than the indelible mark of death upon 
sovereignty. The national production of violence is a ceaseless political performance of which 
migrants are forced to play a part, and thus, the nation-state proves itself to be faithless to all but 
its own sovereignty. In the following section, I will present an empirical account of this very 
process in place at the Southwestern United States border, and I aim only to demonstrate the 
material consequences of nationalization upon those who resist it. 
 
  
98 Mbembe, ​Necropolitics, ​18. 
64 
Chapter 3: The United States 
The Innate Brutality of American Sovereignty 
 
In this final chapter, I will use a single case to provide an empirical demonstration of the 
concepts that I have discussed in the previous chapters. The national border that I find best 
exemplifies these concepts is the Southwestern border that separates the United States from 
Mexico, and I aim to convey the brutality of sovereign reproduction through an examination of 
American policy and the dynamics that have accompanied their implementation. In doing so, I 
intend to establish the border-rendering process, sacred life, and national legitimation as more 
than abstract theoretical concepts, but rather as material dynamics with immensely violent 
consequences for those who resist national narratives. 
I will build from David Campbell’s conception of dynamic statehood to illustrate that 
nation-states are not static entities, but beings whose construction can never be fully realized; 
national identity, and the sovereignty that requires it, are always at odds with the constructed and 
performative nature innately embedded in nationhood - a nature which can never be revealed.  99
According to Campbell, “No state possesses a prediscursive, stable identity, and no state is free 
from the tension between the various domains that need to be aligned for a political community 
to come into being, an alignment that is a response to, rather than constitutive of, a prior and 
stable identity.”  The tensions that Campbell describes are perhaps most salient along the 100
dynamics facilitated by the U.S.-Mexico border, where those who intend to cross are caught on 
the threshold of inclusion and exclusion; life and death; belonging and statelessness. Ultimately, 
the Mexican and Central American migrants who attempt to cross the U.S.-Mexico border 
99 Campbell, ​Writing Security, ​9. 
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represent both a fundamental threat to the logic of statehood, as well as an optimal weapon that 
the United States may wield in order to momentarily neutralize the relentless tension between 
sovereignty and identity. In this chapter, I will begin with a brief contextualization of Mexican 
and Central American patterns of migration into the United States, and the subsequent 
production of identity-based discourses of danger intended to otherize Latin American migrants 
within American communities. I will then use American policy and its reverberations to exhibit 
how the nation-state purposefully reduces the migrant to a ​homo sacer​, and how, through the 
imposition of direct and structural violence, migrants are effectively subordinated and subject to 
widespread political erasure. Finally, I aim to illuminate how this subordination and erasure is 
exploited by the United States, which weaponizes the migrant’s condition of sacred life in order 
to forge - over and over again - its own identity in the eyes of its citizens and thus, fortify its 
legitimacy as a sovereign body. 
Production of Migrant Danger 
Background 
Like any other transnational pattern of movement, the presence of Latin American 
migrants in the United States has been fostered by worldwide processes that may be traced back 
centuries, perhaps even millenia. While I can not provide an entire history of these processes of 
global colonization, hierarchy, and identity, I do wish to briefly emphasize the long and 
destructive history of U.S. involvement in Latin America in order to provide a cohesive backdrop 
for my analysis. There are several sociopolitical dynamics that are most frequently attributed to 
the movement of Mexican and Central Americans into the United States, which include gang 
violence, drug trade, economic strife, and lack of protection by the government. I believe that 
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examining the American influence in current Central American and Mexican political dynamics 
is important not only as it provides an integral element to my own analysis of borders and 
sovereignty, but as it additionally acknowledges the role of the United States in fostering the 
current conditions in Central America and Mexico - a role which the United States government 
has repeatedly refused accountability for, and about which has failed to educate its citizens. 
There are three elements operationalized by the United States that I will highlight in what 
follows: Cold War dynamics, crime policy, and economic neoliberalism. In discussing each 
theme, I intend to illustrate the manner in which the United States has facilitated the very 
conditions that define Central American and Mexican migration past the U.S.-Mexico border 
today. 
While the purpose of U.S. involvement in Central America during the 1980s has been 
debated by scholars, many have come to agree that the defining foreign policy of the time is 
undeniably linked to American Cold War interests. At the time, the Reagan administration 
rationalized U.S. involvement in the region by citing security concerns as the principal 
motivation, despite the observed lack of a salient security threat at the time.  Continuing an 101
American legacy of anti-Communist sentiment, the Reagan administration’s policy objectives 
included the crushing of insurgencies in El Salvador and Guatemala, and expected cooperation 
from other countries in the region such as Honduras and Costa Rica in achieving this goals.  102
These insurgencies were left-wing responses to economic and civil disparities, led largely by 
indigenous peoples and peasants against the military-controlled governments of each nation. 
Acting upon right-wing ideological and economic interests, the United States combatted these 
101 John H. Coatsworth, “United States Interventions,” ​Revista ​(2005) 2. 
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insurgencies through the funding, training, and public support of numerous brutal 
administrations and counterinsurgency efforts: upon the 1982 presidential installation of former 
general Efraín Ríos Montt, Reagan renewed economic aid to Guatemala, lauding the 
government’s apparent defense of the country against the threat of Communism. In response, the 
Ríos Montt administration acted swiftly and brutally, destroying an estimated 686 indigenous 
villages - resulting in the deaths of some 50,000 to 75,000 people.  In El Salvador, the Reagan 103
administration continued to provide military aid in amounts escalating from $5.7 million in 1980 
to $110.3 million in 1984, with Reagan having used emergency powers to appropriate the final 
$32 million following refusal of congressional consent for the funds.  This funding was in spite 104
of the fact that nearly 40,000 people, many of them unarmed civilians, had been murdered by the 
armed forces between 1979 and 1984 - a defining feature of these civil wars were U.S.-trained 
death squads, which terrorized civilians and razed indigenous villages in order to quell 
resistance.  105
A final crucial note on United States Cold War policy in Central America is the 
widespread ambiguity, convolution, and outright denial of U.S. involvement and action in the 
region. Wrongfully citing security concerns as the motivation behind U.S. intervention was not 
the only oversight of the Reagan administration. The administration also plainly denied or 
diminished the human rights abuses that occurred in El Salvador and Guatemala in order to 
continue providing military aid to the counterinsurgencies.  Furthermore, of the refugees 106
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produced by these civil wars - 1 million from Guatemala; over 500,000 from El Salvador - only a 
mere three percent of Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum cases were approved. The denial of 
human rights violations in both countries led the administration to classify asylum seekers 
simply as “economic migrants,” and continue to pour aid into the military regimes in El Salvador 
and Guatemala.   107
Many of the migrants that fled the turbulence and brutality of the civil wars found 
themselves in Los Angeles in the 1990s, and their children began to form small gangs or 
conform to already existing ones as a result of their lack of opportunity in American 
communities.  As street gang-related violence increased and became a recognized issue in 108
Southern California, U.S. officials introduced the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act. The 1996 act signified an expansion of the “get-tough” approach 
to immigration law, greatly expanding the offenses for which a person could be deported or 
stripped of their citizenship. As a result, the number of deportees to Central America rose into 
the thousands for the remaining years of the 1990s.   109
Though security concerns may actually have motivated the Clinton administration’s 
hard-line approach to the growing issue of street gangs, Congress proceeded with little 
consideration or care for the wellbeing of three countries that, only a decade before, had suffered 
major social, economic, and political upheaval - much of which was facilitated by U.S. funding 
of brutal counterinsurgency measures. As a result, the spike in U.S. deportees to Central America 
supercharged gangs such as MS-13, and disseminated gang presence throughout Central America 
and Mexico.  
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Additionally, the tough-on-crime policies implemented in U.S. cities like New York  110
during the early 2000s influenced some Central American regimes to espouse ​mano dura ​(strong 
hand) policies - characterized by strict measures such as the pursuit and detainment of youths 
simply on the suspicion of gang involvement without evidence or due process. Such policies 
were “encouraged by U.S. law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the Drug Enforcement 
Agency, which were working with Central American governments to control crime.”  With the 111
crackdown and mass incarceration of gang members, gang leaders were now able to meet and 
organize criminal activities - thus, contributing the centralization and strengthening of 
ultraviolent gangs like MS-13 and M-18. 
Finally, American economic neoliberalism is also a driving force behind the conditions 
that have mobilized migration into the U.S. from Central America and Mexico. Measures such as 
CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic - Central America Free Trade Agreement) and NAFTA 
(North American Free Trade Agreement) have both been accused of restructuring the region’s 
economy to guarantee dependence on the United States through the influx of American goods 
and immense trade imbalances that weaken domestic industries.  The economic strife and 112113
displacement in the region contributed both to the rapid urbanization that strengthened the gangs​,
 as well as the mass movement of migrants North into the United States.  114
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Discourses of Danger 
Having provided a brief overview of the conditions that foster Central American and 
Mexican migration to the United States, I now must address the discourse that has been produced 
alongside the growing Latin American presence in the U.S.. To reiterate what I discussed in the 
first chapter, the state requires discourses of danger in order to promote a social space of “us” 
and “them” (citizen and foreigner; outsider and insider) and portray the migrant as a threat to 
national security and prosperity. Campbell writes, “The ability to represent things as alien, 
subversive, dirty, or sick has been pivotal to the articulation of danger in the American 
experience.”  According to Campbell, even the simple existence of an alternative identity, one 115
which exemplifies that different identities are possible and legitimate, denaturalizes the claim of 
one identity as being the “true” identity and might be enough to produce the perception of a 
threat.  He continues, “For both insurance and international relations, therefore, danger results 116
from the calculation of a threat that objectifies events, disciplines relations, and sequesters an 
ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk.”  The promotion of the “us” and “them” 117
social space exceeds geography - it also results in a perceived moral divergence between the 
citizen and the foreigner.  118
Upon this perception of contrasting morality, the discourse of danger surrounding Latin 
American migrants in the United States is grounded. This discourse is characterized by rhetoric 
that paints the migrant as a threat, enforcing and reinforcing assumptions that Latin American 
migrants are engaged in drug trafficking, gang violence, tax evasion, and other forms of violent 
115 Campbell, ​Writing Security, ​3. 
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and nonviolent crime. While the notion persists that the particularly explicit racialized discourse 
against migrants is mainly the province of the uneducated, many well-known academics have 
also contributed to this discourse - at times in a highly forceful manner, as is the case with 
Samuel Huntington’s 2004 article “The Hispanic Challenge.” In this article, Huntington laments 
the way in which high numbers of Latin American migrants contribute to the degradation of 
American society, proclaiming that Mexican Americans must “think of themselves as members 
of a small minority who must accommodate the dominant group and adopt its culture.”  He 119
concludes his testimony to the persistence of “Anglo-White” culture with this particularly bold 
message: “There is no Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an 
Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if 
they dream in English.”  Huntington’s perception of “hispanic” migrants as detrimental to 120
American society exemplifies the notion of moral superiority fostered by discourses of danger. 
His sentiments are not an anomaly either. Rather, they are reinforced, however subtly, by forces 
as persuasive as the american government. 
Administrations from both sides of the political spectrum are responsible for perpetuating 
these myths, and in doing so not only reinforce misunderstandings of migrants held by their 
constituents, but also allow for policy building to exacerbate these misunderstandings. In 1995, 
Bill Clinton promised in his State of the Union speech to “end the abuse” of American 
immigration laws and crack down on “illegal aliens” allegedly burdening the economy.  Ten 121
years later, George W. Bush said in his own State of the Union speech that new immigration 
119 Samuel Huntington, “The Hispanic Challenge,” ​Foreign Policy ​(2004) 44. 
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policy was necessary that would “close the borders to drug dealers and terrorists.”  During his 122
State of the Union address on February 12, 2013, President Barack Obama argued for heightened 
security as a way to slow undocumented migration flows: ‘Real reform means strong border 
security, and we can build on the progress my administration has already made— putting more 
boots on the southern border than at any time in our history and reducing illegal crossings to 
their lowest levels in 40 years.’”  His 2014 Immigration Accountability Executive Action, 123
though largely recognized as a progressive reformation of American immigration policy, 
encouraged increased securitization at the border and touted the importance of “cracking down” 
on migrants with criminal records.   Since his campaign in 2016, Donald Trump presidency has 124
been largely defined by his engaging in controversial rhetoric about migrants, including the 
claim that many Mexican migrants are bringing drugs, crime, and rape to the United States.   125
Each of these key moments in U.S. immigration policy represent the use of a conception 
that has been widespread in American political discourse. This conception, which justifies the 
consistent increase in border securitization and criminalization of unauthorized immigration, 
presents the migrant as an inherent danger to American security and prosperity. In recent 
decades, it is the Latin American migrant who finds themself perhaps the largest target for this 
discourse, making up the vast majority of migrants into American territory, and therefore is 
frequently framed as inherent to American safety and security. 
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However, the belief that the majority of Latin American migrants are engaged in criminal 
activity, whether it be drug trade, gang activity, or other forms of violent crime - and that the 
Southwestern border is a pipeline for these crimes - has also been disproven on a number of 
occasions. Studies have consistently found that migrants commit crimes at a much lower rate 
than citizens born in the U.S., and that there is a negative correlation between levels of 
immigration and crime rates.  The Cato Institute also concluded that unauthorized migrants are 126
less likely to be incarcerated than birthright citizens.  The DEA has confirmed that most drug 127
trafficking occurs at ports of entry into the United States, rather than between them.  128
Though threats to economic anxiety may seem more benign in comparison to those 
towards public safety, the impact of Latin American migrants on U.S. prosperity is a large source 
of anxiety for many American citizens. Still, the widely kept notion that migrants cost the United 
States billions of dollars each year was disputed by a bipartisan analysis published by the 
National Academy of Sciences in 2017, which determined that the average immigrant makes a 
net positive fiscal contribution of $259,000 in net present value across the federal, state, and 
local levels of government.  The assumption that migrants are largely responsible for welfare 129
consumption was also swiftly discredited by the Cato Institute, whose studies found that adult 
immigrants are 47% less likely to receive social security benefits and 27% less likely to receive 
benefits based on age or income status than citizens born in the U.S.  Finally, the claim that 130
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migrants do not pay taxes also has little ground in reality: the ADL reports that immigrants 
collectively pay between $90 and $140 billion each year in taxes, and that undocumented 
immigrants alone pay approximately $11.64 billion in taxes each year.  
The marked dissonance between the conventional discourse regarding Latin American 
migrants and the migrants themselves highlight the fact that such discourse, no matter how 
misinformative, may be serving a more clandestine function. Discourses of danger, I have 
argued, lay the ground for brutal border policy that allows the nation-state to effectively carry out 
sovereign violence upon the migrant. As this process is operationalized, however, such discourse 
is serving two other functions that are closely intertwined: the production of American identity 
both as state, and as a​ specific kind​ of state. Primarily, the distinction of insider from outsider is 
essential to the construction of any nation-state, and in mobilizing discourses that embolden this 
distinction, the United States has effectively reaffirmed its own status as a nation-state. This 
reaffirmation is in accordance with the process of national formation in Chapter 1, as any 
nation-state must form itself ​against​ the identity of a constructed “other.” However, the United 
States is also engaging in identity production in a far more specific manner, constructing itself as 
a unique entity within the nationalized system - in a sense, defining what kind of state it is 
among all other states. In this process, the U.S. is wielding discursive power as a way of 
promoting a certain image of America: a nation-state which is defined by hardworking, moral, 
and self-made individuals and in turn must be securitized against people occupying a contrasting 
moral space. In this case, migrants are painted as those individuals; the discursive tactics which 
portray them as lazy, opportunistic, and uncivilized signify their innate incohesion with what is 
perceived to be American society. This process once again demonstrates, in a magnified and 
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more detailed way, how identity is constructed against the “other.” If migrants embody specific 
traits that are so incongruent with American society that security measures must be taken against 
them, American society must be the opposite. 
 In what follows, I will demonstrate, through a number of policies passed by multiple 
American administrations, how the United States has produced a legacy of criminalization, 
exploitation, and subordination targeted towards those who wish to cross the border. 
 
Necropolitical Policy 
In 1994, with Latin American migrants now providing the majority of immigration into 
the United States, Border Patrol enacted the strategy known as “Prevention Through Deterrence” 
(PTD) with the purpose of deterring the attempts of migrants to permeate the Southwestern 
border.  Soon after, the 1996 the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 131
(IIRIRA) transformed immigration policy in the U.S., expanding crimes for which one could be 
deported to include minor offenses.  Both PTD and IIRIRA were enacted under the 132
administration of Bill Clinton. During the George W. Bush administration, Bush oversaw the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security and brought criminal prosecutions of 
unauthorized migrants to full force under the initiative Operation Streamline.  While Barack 133
Obama’s presidency adopted a more progressive immigration platform, his administration 
facilitated a number of harmful policies, including the expansion of a law that allowed for police 
officers to turn over suspects and criminals to immigration authorities in order to authorize their 
deportation - a policy that was widely criticized for racial profiling and the violation of numerous 
131 ​De León, ​The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail ​. 
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civil rights.  In later years, In 2018, the Trump administration’s DHS enacted a 134
“zero-tolerance” policy wherein every person caught crossing the border without authorization is 
to be referred for federal prosecution, whether or not they have valid asylum claims or are first 
time offenders.   135
I aim to provide far more detail about each of these policies in what follows, though I will 
not discuss them according to the chronological framework I have just provided. I will instead 
examine each according to their contributions to the border-rendering process, and subsequently 
how they permit the Latin American migrant’s exposure to sovereign violence.  
Violence 
What first must be addressed is the term “violence.” Colloquially, the term “violence” is 
likely to signify direct action imposed upon someone with the intention of causing physical 
harm. A more broad understanding of violence is provided by the World Health Organization as: 
“The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another 
person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of 
resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.” This definition 
is perhaps more reminiscent of the model of direct versus structural violence, where “direct 
violence” is characterized by action that directly and immediately or (near-immediately) results 
in a person’s physical harm or death, while “structural violence” refers to widespread, gradual 
action that results in the deaths of many by depriving them access to basic necessities. An 
example of direct violence would be an instance of sexual assault, whereas an example of 
134 Villalobos, José D. “Promises and Human Rights: The Obama Administration and Immigrant Detention Policy 
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structural violence might be the deprivation of affordable healthcare to an entire population. 
Many also include “cultural violence” as a third categorization, wherein cultural aspects of a 
specific population are used to justify the imposition of structural (perhaps even direct) violence 
directly upon that population; an example of this would be institutionalized racism. Other 
thinkers dissect the branches of violence even further, designating specific areas of “violence” to 
harm against the environment, the limitation of access to land, economic violence, and other 
factors.  136
Evidently, the study and categorization is extremely nuanced and may be expressed in a 
number of different ways according to different schools of thought. I do not wish to establish my 
own categorization of violence, but simply ensure that the concept of “violence” may be 
understood to encompass not only instances of direct violence, but other indirect and long-lasting 
forms of violence as well (that might be classified as structural any other subgroup.) Sovereign 
violence as it manifests within the nation-state is not limited to the shooting of a gun, but to 
conditions that exist for the purpose of subordination, exploitation, and detention. For the 
purposes of this paper, I will demonstrate the necropolitical nature of American border policy 
first through policy as it reduces the migrant to a ​homo sacer​ by means of criminalization. Next, 
I will discuss direct violence imposed upon migrants by both state and non-state actors - with the 
understanding that the nation-state is largely responsible for this violence in totality due to the 
conditions fostered by border policy. I will then expand my scope to analyzing the structural 
violence enacted through necropolitical policy through the respective detention, exploitation, and 
erasure of the migrant. 




For many Americans, this person—whose remains are so ravaged that his or her sex is 
unknown—is (was) an “illegal,” a noncitizen who broke U.S. law and faced the 
consequences. Many of these same people tell themselves that if they can keep calling 
them “illegals,” they can avoid speaking their names or imagining their faces.  
Jason De León, The Land of Open Graves 
 
In order to achieve a comprehensive outlook on the sovereign violence imposed upon 
migrants, it is imperative to consider the role criminalization policies have played in sanctioning 
violence against migrants. It wasn’t until 1929 that the act of crossing the border without 
authorization became criminalized, following Section 1325 in Title 8 of the U.S. Code. This law 
went largely unenforced for the majority of the twentieth century, and the vast majority of 
unauthorized border-crossers were not brought up on criminal charges.  With the Clinton 137
administration’s introduction of the IIRIRA, the scope of who could be deported was greatly 
broadened.. Additionally, the crimes for which one could be deported were extended to include 
minor offenses such as drunk driving and petty theft, or even minor drug offenses and speeding. 
Even foreign-born citizens became at risk for deportation, now able to be stripped of their 
citizenship and deported after serving their prison terms.  138
Following the events of 9/11 and the heightened fear of terrorism, President George W. 
Bush introduced a number of policies aimed at securitization, including the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In 2005, the Bush administration brought criminal 
prosecutions of unauthorized migrants to full force with the introduction of Operation 
137 Del Valle, “The Dark, Racist History of Section 1325 of U.S. Immigration Law.” 
138 ​Arana, “How the Street Gangs Took Central America.” 
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Streamline: an initiative of the DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) with the intention of 
combatting weapon and drug trafficking, human smuggling, and repeat instances of unauthorized 
entry into the United States.  The stated goal of this initiative was to achieve total 139
criminalization of unauthorized border crossing into the United States.  Initially, migrants were 140
charged with misdemeanors for their first attempt to cross the border; felonies for their second 
attempt; and then faced formal deportation. The impact of this policy was evident: there were 
rarely more than 20,000 deportations every year before the mid-1980s, and by the mid 2000s that 
number had escalated to 400,000 per year.  With the Obama and Trump administrations 141
following in the legacy of Operation Streamline, immigration offenses now make up the majority 
of criminal prosecutions in the U.S..  The border became more securitized with the increase in 142
funding and hiring of Border Patrol, and according to Jones, “In the past, most migrants detained 
at the border were quickly processed and voluntarily repatriated to Mexico, often within a few 
hours of being caught...an acknowledgement that the vast majority of migrants at the border were 
poor workers, not smugglers or criminals.”  In fact, the securitization of the border and increase 143
in deporations has only bolstered human smuggling - when an unauthorized migrant is deported, 
they are likely to attempt to cross the border again in a few days, producing more clients for 
human smugglers. Owing to a recent policy, Central American deportees who were denied 
asylum in the United States are dropped off on the Mexican side of the border and almost 
guaranteed to be kidnapped - they are easily discernible as deportees to highly-organized 
139 Joanna Lydgate, “Assembly Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline,” ​The Chief Justice Earl Warren 
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networks who kidnap migrants and hold them for ransom, demanding thousands of dollars from 
their relatives in return for their safe release.  The fostering of human smuggling is not specific 144
to the United States, either: Khosravi highlights that similar dynamics have unfolded at borders 
across the world including Malaysia, South Africa, and Iran.  145
Following the introduction of Operation Streamline, migrants have been subjected to 
criminalization for attempting to cross the border. Operation Streamline has been the subject of 
intense scrutiny, especially regarding its introduction of bundling and rapid processing cases: 
under this operation, cases are often not heard individually but in large groups that can amount to 
up to 70 cases in one hearing; individuals are often shackled and herded into courtrooms, with 
officials taking as little as 30 seconds to review each case.  Critics note that this is a violation of 146
due process, and many individuals who are United States citizens or have legitimate claims to 
asylum do not have an opportunity to present their cases. The infringement on due process that 
occurs in these courtrooms is only one example of how criminalization policy allows the United 
States to subordinate migrants, however. Agamben’s notion of state of exception is noted by 
Jason De León to be an important concept when it comes to the function American borders. He 
refers to border zones as “spaces of exception - physical and political locations where an 
individual’s rights and protections under law can be stripped away upon entrance.”  As the fear 147
of terrorism following the events of 9/11 gave way to Operation Streamline, the fear of Latin 
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American migrants and their impact on American security and prosperity have allowed for the 
continuation of unjust, violent practices at the Southwestern Border. 
Plainly, the illegalization of border-crossing is not organic but constructed. The burden of 
illegality is central to American border policy: it is a strategic production harnessed in order to 
legitimize the sovereign violence enacted upon outsiders who intend to move inwards. The issue 
of migration into the United States, in its redefinition from a social condition to a crime, permits 
the production of criminals insofar as it reconfigures the violence imposed upon them as 
“punishment” - ultimately implying that the migrant has done something to warrant their 
exposure to violence. Furthermore, the production of illegality strengthens the Border Spectacle, 
De Genova writes, “In place of the social and political relation of migrants to the state, therefore, 
the spectacle of border enforcement yields up the thing-like fetish of migrant 'illegality' as a 
self-evident 'fact', generated by its own supposed act of violation.”  Once again, the power of 148
identities that have been forged against one another is demonstrated, as it provides a “norm” of 
illegality to be prescribed to migrants in contrast to the lawful citizen.  In this, the contrasting 149
spaces of morality are constituted and upheld, and migrants experience further differentiation 
and alienation as perceived bearers of “illegality.” 
Agamben derives his concept of sacred life from an ancient Roman principle, wherein a 
criminal was subject to the revocation of his citizenship. He all at once existed both within the 
law and without it: rendered ​homo sacer​ following his violation of the law, and owing to the 
onus of illegality he now bore, was placed ​by​ the law ​beyond​ the law. As the law stripped him of 
his citizenship, his life - and death - were beyond the scope of law. The ​homo sacer​ is one who 
148 De Genova, “Spectacles of Migrant ‘Illegality.” 
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can be violated or killed with impunity, for their criminality has placed them outside of the 
sphere of law. This is how the production of illegality operates: it redefines border-crossing as a 
crime and thus burdens the migrant with illegality. The migrant, reduced to bare life and 
rendered a ​homo sacer​, is now subject to a spectrum of violence that is legitimized by their 
condition and ultimately perpetuated, directly or indirectly, by the state. 
 
Deterrence 
The most salient pattern of sovereign violence carried out against migrants in the United 
States is likely direct violence perpetrated by state actors. The perpetrators to which I refer as 
“state actors” are those who work in an institution of the American government. This can include 
police officers, members of the military, and those upon whom I will mainly focus my attention 
here: agents of the Department of Homeland security, including agents of Customs and Border 
Patrol and ICE. Operation Streamline and the accompanying policy enacted by the Bush 
administration following 9/11 saw an immense increase in heightened border securitization of 
the mid-2000s, resulting in a hiring surge that almost doubled the force’s size in the years 
following 9/11. With that increase came an increase in complaints of excessive force.  As the 150
U.S. government came to prioritize border security, the standards for who could qualify to be a 
Border Patrol agent were lowered, resulting in the employment of people who were untrained, 
unqualified, or had violent records.  U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is 151152
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responsible for almost half a million arrests per year, as well as a correspondingly high use of 
force, with CBP reporting nearly 1,000 uses of force in 2017 alone. These instances range from 
fatal shootings to “less-lethal force,” an umbrella term for physical assault, dog attacks, pepper 
spray, stun guns, and batons. One famous case of death inflicted by Border Patrol is that of 
fifteen-year-old Sergio Adrián Hernández ​Güereca​, who​ ​was allegedly throwing rocks at border 
agent Jesus Mesa Jr as he forcibly apprehended a friend of Hernández ​Güereca​. Mesa Jr. shot 
and killed Hernández ​Güereca​, despite the fact that Hernández ​Güereca ​was at least 20 to 30 
meters away from his assailant and on the opposite side of the border when he was shot.  153
Despite video evidence of the incident, Mesa Jr. was not indicted for the murder. Furthermore, 
the supreme court ruled on February 25, 2020 that the parents of Hernández could not sue Mesa 
Jr. for his use of excessive force against their teenage son, citing that no legal action taken could 
be taken owing to the “cross-border” nature of the shooting​. Other ​shootings that have been ruled 
in favor of the defendant agents include the 2010 murder of 18-year-old Juan Mendez, an 
unarmed citizen was shot in the back from a distance while running from an agent in Texas; 
unarmed 19-year-old citizen Carlos Lamadrid, who was shot in the back as he climbed a border 
fence in Arizona in 2011; and unarmed 20-year-old Gerardo Lozano Rico, who was shot in 
Texas in a fleeing car in 2011.  It is also important to keep in mind that these numbers for CBP 154
use of force are self-reported, and they also don’t account for the dozens of instances of sexual 
assault by CBP reported every year.  155
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The direct violence perpetrated by state actors at the border, and the manner in which 
American securitization policy exacerbated the issue immensely, only demonstrates one aspect 
of sovereign violence and does not even account for the majority of death at the U.S.-Mexico 
border. In fact, it is the violence imposed upon migrants by non-state actors - including 
environmental factors and civilians - that most significantly constitutes the apparatus of death at 
work in the Southwestern borderlands. Here, the distinction between direct and structural 
violence will be blurred, due in large part to the dynamics of violence as it manifests through 
non-human and non-state actors. However, my point remains the same: that United States border 
policy is responsible for the production of violence at the Southwestern border. One policy in 
particular, known as Prevention Through Deterrence (PTD), produced a bloody legacy that has 
defined the U.S.-Mexico border as one of the deadliest in the world. PTD is a strategy that was 
implemented by Border Patrol in 1993 in an attempt to address high numbers of unauthorized 
border entry and wide public scrutiny regarding current border policy. Prior to 1993, the standard 
procedure for agents was to attempt to apprehend migrants after they had crossed into the United 
States.  PTD was introduced as a strategy intended to address the problem directly at the border 156
by securitizing areas with high instances of unauthorized entry. With sub-operations like 
Operation Blockade in San Diego and Operation Hold-The-Line in El Paso, urban points of entry 
into the U.S. were sealed off by fences, barbed wire, additional agents, response teams, cameras, 
and other technology.  As a result of this, migrants are funneled through desert and wilderness 157
in an attempt to reach the U.S. border. While migrants who attempt this journey are still at risk of 
experiencing violence at the hands of a Border Patrol agent, they face a myriad of other 
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challenges that condemn them to almost certain death or trauma.  Migrants attempting the 158
journey through the Sonoran desert, for instance, are likely to encounter harm and death in a 
variety of other ways: injury, dehydration, hypothermia, heat stroke, exhaustion, wild animals, 
infection, bandits, human smugglers, and sexual and physical abuse are regular challenges that 
migrants face during their journey to the border.  159
It is easy to dismiss this kind of danger as a “natural” part of undertaking a journey 
throughs such a landscape. However, the hardship migrants experience on the way to the border 
is a form of violence sanctioned by American border policy; though indirect, it is just as much a 
result of border strategy and law as deaths directly perpetuated by border agents or in migrant 
holding facilities. The deterrence model has been widely scrutinized in Jason DeLeón’s ​Land of 
Open Graves,​ where he claims that PTD is merely a strategy conjured by Border Patrol in order 
to “draw on the agency of animals and other nonhumans to do its dirty work while 
simultaneously absolving itself of any blame connected to migrant injuries or loss of life.”  De 160
León highlights that while PTD has had little impact on the numbers of people attempting to 
cross the border, it has resulted in an upsurge of fatalities as people try and fail to make the 
journey.  While Border Patrol estimates 6,000 have died since the 1990s, other estimates are far 161
higher.  And, as De León explained in depth, many bodies are never recovered, so precision is 162
impossible. 
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In regards to PTD, De León adds, “...the Border Patrol has intentionally set the stage so 
that other actants can do most of the brutal work...I see this environment as the perfect silent 
partner in boundary control.”  He also notes that the architects of this strategy, as well as others 163
who enforced it in later years, were aware of its lethality, justifying the deaths as the cost of 
protecting the nation: for example, he cites a 1997 account from the Government Accountability 
office that identifies “deaths of aliens attempting entry” as one of the “indicators for measuring 
the effectiveness of the strategy to deter alien entry.”  Truthfully, Prevention Through 164
Deterrence did not, in fact, deter migrants, but created a space which isolated migrants from the 
public eye, funneling them away from urban areas of entry and forcing them to instead attempt to 
undertake dangerous pathways characterized by perilous terrain, extreme climate, and 
inconceivable violence. PTD is perhaps the most salient example of the state of exception, which 
is largely a political condition, materializing as geographic. The terrain surrounding the 
U.S.-Mexico border was transformed effectively into a deathscape where a migrant becomes a 
homo sacer​ owing to their intent to cross a border and may thus be killed with impunity - by wild 
animals, climate conditions, bandits, or agents. The actor that perhaps best exemplifies the 
unpunishability of migrant death, however, is the vigilante. Jason De León recounts his horror at 
the presence of ​cazamigrantes​ within the Southwestern borderlands - translated to 
“migrant-hunters,” ​cazamigrantes​ - in recent years, a number of border crossers have reported 
white men, dressed in camouflage, shooting at them in the desert.  Quite literally, the 165
Southwestern borderlands have become a space in which civilians may attempt to kill migrants 
163 De León, ​The Land of Open Graves,​ 61. 
164 Ibid.​,​ 67. 
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for sport, understanding that the isolated landscape and unforgiving environment signifies the 
impunity of their actions. 
 
Zero-Tolerance 
The use of “deterrence” as a strategy of justification for lethal policy brings me to a third 
condition of violence: detention. As PTD rendered the migrant a ​homo sacer, ​the criminalization 
of border-crossing produced by strategies like Operation Streamline allowed the migrant’s sacred 
life to extend beyond the borderlands and well into the nation, providing the framework for the 
policies of detention that characterized both the Obama and Trump administrations. Obama’s 
presidency has been perceived as taking a progressive approach to immigration reform compared 
to his predecessor, attempting to direct the scope of deportation to “criminals” as opposed to 
children, families, and those who had not committed any crimes. However, the Obama 
administration oversaw the deporting of 3 million - an estimated 1.7 of whom had no criminal 
record. These mass deportations were largely due to the administration’s expansion of 
enforcement, an effort which supporters of the administration argue was a way to appeal to the 
conservatives who opposed progressive migration reform. Regardless of intent, the internal 
enforcement of the Obama administration did not only result in mass deportations but a shift 
from “returns” to “removals.”  “Returns,” which were used during the first term of the Bush 166
administration, signified the deportation of a migrant in such a way that their fingerprints were 
not taken and their immigration records were unmarked. At the tail end of the Bush 
administration, the DHS shifted instead to formal “removals,” a process which created a 
166 Sarah R. Coleman, “A Promise Unfulfilled, an Imperfect Legacy: OBAMA AND IMMIGRATION POLICY.” 
The Presidency of Barack Obama: A First Historical Assessment. ​(Princeton University Press, 2018) 184. 
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permanent record - an action which meant that those who were attempting to cross again risked 
jail time and were prohibited from applying for legal status for at least five years. The Obama 
administration embraced removals more forcefully, as formal removal charges were filed in 
cases up almost 30% from Bush’s final year. Under the Obama administration, the scope of 
criminality was broadened to apply to at least 90% of cases, contributing to a foundation upon 
which Obama’s successor, Donald Trump, could exacerbate the violent effects of American 
migration policy. 
Under the Trump administration in 2018, the DHS enacted what is commonly known as 
the “zero-tolerance” policy. While some aspects of the policy, such as family separation, are 
largely attributable to the Trump administration, other features, such as the detainment of 
migrants in prison-like facilities, preceded Donald Trump’s inauguration and have simply been 
exacerbated by zero-tolerance. However, what makes zero-tolerance a compelling example of 
necropower is the further criminalization of migrants, building from the enforcement reforms of 
the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, and the human rights violations that accompany 
it. Under the zero-tolerance strategy, every person caught crossing the border without 
authorization is to be referred to federal prosecution, whether or not they have valid asylum 
claims or are first time offenders.  Detention was once restricted to those who posed a definite 167
risk to public safety; under zero-tolerance, asylum seekers, first-time offenders, and all others 
apprehended at the border are detained in facilities in what is called “civil detention.” They are 
not serving time for a crime, but waiting for a hearing to determine whether they may legally 
167 Tal Kopan, “New DHS policy could separate families caught crossing the border illegally,” ​CNN Politics​, 7 May 
2018. 
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remain in the country. Their detention is justified as being intended to ensure that people show 
up for the hearings.   168
Though President Trump reversed the feature of family separation after intense political 
pressure, he instructed the DOJ to overturn the Flores Agreement  so that children, and families 169
with children, can be held indefinitely in U.S. Immigrantion and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
facilities.  In detention centers, migrants wait an average of more than four weeks to be 170
released, though it is reported that some are held for years and even decades. Thousands of 
detainees have reported sexual and physical abuse inside the facilities.  The environment of 171
many of the centers has been characterized as inhumane, with migrants (including children) 
facing conditions including but not limited to: poor nutrition; limited or no access to showers, 
baths, or toothbrushes and toothpaste; extreme overcrowding; limited or no access to neccessary 
medications; freezing temperatures; exposure to the elements; physical abuse; sexual abuse; and 
limited or no access to legal counsel.  At least six children died in holding facilities in 2019,  172 173
and at least 24 migrants have died in ICE facilities  alone during the Trump administration— 174
numbers that don’t include the range of other facilities holding migrants.  Causes of death 175
range from illness to suicide to physical trauma to unknown.  176
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Policies such as Operation Streamline and zero-tolerance are largely responsible for 
strategies that allow migrants to be stripped of their rights and face extreme violence, abuse, and 
death. The Trump administration has acknowledged the cruelty of some of the features of 
zero-tolerance, specifically family separation, claiming that the measure was intended to deter 
migrants from attempting to cross the border.  However, as measures such as PTD 177
demonstrated long ago, strategies of deterrence are largely ineffective - at least in capacity to 
deter migrants from crossing borders. The Southwestern U.S. border, and the policy that has 
informed what it is today, finds a brutal efficacy through the process of stripping away a 
migrant’s political life and inflicting sovereign violence upon them. Prevention Through 
Deterrence, in generating copious death at the Southwestern borderlands, created a space of 
exception where a migrant could be extracted from their political life, forcibly reducing them to a 
homo sacer​; the migrant, in only their intent and attempt to cross the border, became a target for 
manifold violence permitted and exacerbated by national policy. Strategies of illegalization, such 
as the IIRIRA and Operation Streamline allowed the migrant’s sacred life to shadow them, 
beyond the borderlands and well into the United States, ensuring that that migrant found 
themself in a nearly permanent state of exception - a ​homo sacer ​by way of their inevitable 
burden of illegality. The zero-tolerance policies introduced in the 2010s are both a consequence 
and exacerbation of their predecessors, seeing to a spectacle of securitization that disguises the 
legacy of sovereign violence ordained by decades of brutal policy - a legacy which is manifest in 
the detention centers, at the borders, and throughout the entirety of the United States.  
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Exploitation and Erasure: National Systems of Oppression 
The brutality exercised as a result of border policy - in the desert, within the detention 
centers - is a mechanism that is both a method of subordination and subordination manifest. As 
discourses of danger have made possible these policies of illegalization, deterrence, and 
zero-tolerance, the policies themselves both actively subjugate the migrant while simultaneously 
acting as evidence of the subjugation already imposed upon the migrant by the performative 
aspect of discourses of danger. The sovereign cycle of self-reproduction thus relies on the 
ever-pervasive dynamics which divide insider from outsider and discipline any sort of ambiguity, 
which aids it making the process itself so difficult to identify - it is boundless and unaffixed to 
any sort of geographical or temporal constraints. Thus, those migrants who find themselves 
within the interiority of the United States, those who have avoided deportation and prolonged 
detention, and even those who might have achieved asylum or residency, are likely to remain the 
targets of sovereign violence as long as they remain in the country and perhaps even beyond. The 
direct violence sustained by state-sanctioned strategies of illegalization, deterrence, and zero 
tolerance has two direct outcomes that track the migrant beyond the borderlands and into the 
state that I will discuss in this chapter. The continued violence experienced by migrants living 
within U.S. borders represents the permeation of border policy into the interiority of the state, 
categorically demonstrating how such policy deliberately provides two essential conditions of 





The economic exploitation of the migrant has become a profitable business that begins in 
the detention center. Not all holding facilities are state-run; in fact, less than half of detainees are 
held in ICE centers or local and county jails. The rest are held in facilities run by private prison 
corporations like GEO Group and CoreCivic. These groups derived between 20% and 25% of 
their profits from ICE, which has now become their biggest client.  The policies of 178
criminalization generated a lucrative business in detaining nonviolent offenders, rapidly filling 
up holding facilities and producing billions of dollars in revenue for these corporations - 
effectively, laundering taxpayer money into the private sector.  De León credits this unethical 179
pattern with the business relationships private corporations have formed with American 
legislators, stating “both parties seem to have agreed that if one builds more detention centers the 
other will find ways to fill them.”  While detention-profiteering may come at the cost of the 180
American taxpayer, the lack of transparency surrounding this truth coupled with the spectacle of 
securitization provided by heightened detention sends a powerful message to American citizens: 
that the nation-state is fulfilling its promise of protection against migrants who would, if not 
detained, threaten American security and prosperity.  
The exploitation of the migrant is not only a manner of specticality to ease American 
fears; it is an exploitation necessary to the American way of life. As recently as 2018, the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics reported that migrants (both authorized and unauthorized) make up 17.1% of 
the American workforce, contributing to vital industries such as farming and food production and 
178 Rappeleye, “24 immigrants have died in ICE custody during the Trump administration.” 
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paying billions of dollars in taxes. However, a landmark study found that 37.1% unauthorized 
workers were subject to wage violations, and 84.9% had not been provided the wages they were 
legally entitled to for overtime work.  As I discussed in Chapter 2, the threat of deportation is a 181
factor that prevents unauthorized workers from reporting these abuses. Migrant guestworkers are 
also highly exploited, despite the fact the fact that they have nonimmigrant visas that allow a 
“legal” pathway for employment in the United States. Another study found that many of these 
workers are forced to pay exorbitant fees to labor recruiters (fees that are usually illegal) in order 
to secure employment. Many of these guestworkers find themselves in a form of debt bondage, 
with ill-defined conditions of repayment that leave the lender in control of the lendee.  A 182
number of cases have revealed that some guestworkers have even been forced into human 
trafficking as a result of such practices. College-educated migrant workers in fields of teaching, 
nursing, and computer operations have also been subject to firms and recruiters who steal wages 
and file lawsuits against workers who threaten to quit.  The labor abuses of migrant workers 183
and guestworkers allow industries to keep profits low, a practice that is rampant in some of the 
industries upon which American society is most dependent, such as farming and meatpacking 
industries.   184
Effectively, when policy results in the strengthening of the American economy at the cost 
of migrant wellbeing, sovereignty is unequivocally strengthened. For decades, migrant labor has 
been essential to the bedrock industries of American life, allowing employers to keep costs down 
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at the cost of migrants’ workplace rights. Moreover, the illegalization of migration has been 
profitable even beyond the exploitation of migrant labor-power, as the privatization of holding 
facilities has allowed certain corporations to capitalize on the industry of detention. The way in 
which this kind of exploitation produces American legitimacy goes far beyond whether the 
economy is momentarily in an upturn or downturn; the exploitation of migrant labor, and 
migrant bodies, is essential to the American way of life. Costs of basic necessities (such as food), 
lowered at the expense of the brutal exploitation of unauthorized labor and guestworkers, 
supplement the image of the United States as an entity on which belonging members, or citizens, 
can rely to provide affordable consumerism through responsible legislation and enforcement. In 
actuality, the basis of American consumption is operationalized by the largely unfettered 
capitalist interests of the U.S. government, which allow taxpayer dollars to be funneled into the 
private sector and the continued, unscrupulous treatment of migrant workers in the workplace. 
What is more, the erasure of these conditions from the public eye leads many citizens into 
believing that their economy, and the consumerism it facilitates, is restrained by a cornerstone of 
ethical workplace laws that have been in effect for a century. It is this erasure of the migrant 
narrative that I will now discuss, ultimately demonstrating how it is the final, and perhaps most 
effective, measure of sovereign reproduction. 
 
Political Erasure 
Migrant workers, and the exploitation they experience, are unquestionably contributors to 
the American economy and corporate interests. However, their exploitation achieves something 
else - perhaps the most critical element in the production of national sovereignty. The erasure of 
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the migrant is both the core of all other forms of sovereign violence, and simultaneously the final 
product of each. De León writes, “Immigrants are tolerated when they do the jobs that citizens 
won’t, but the American public has little interest in hearing their voices, preserving their history, 
or affording them any rights. This ‘exceptionalism’ pervades all aspects of undocumented life 
and calls into question our country’s notion of democracy.”  Despite the emergence of migrant 185
communities across the country, the migrant is time and time again subject to erasure: they are 
not invisible, but purposefully forced into spaces that allow for their neglect, alienation, and 
isolation. Funneled into deserts, detention centers, exploitative workplaces, and underserved 
communities, the migrant finds their basic human rights violated and themselves 
disenfranchised, positioned at the intersection of statelessness and sovereignty such that their 
lives are marked by violence in its many forms. The political erasure of the migrant ultimately 
breeds the ignorance of American citizens. They believe that the national apparati of violence - 
the border policy, the detention facilities, the bolstering of the economy - as well as their own 
negligence of those less politically privileged, signify that the United States is truly effective in 
its perceived role: protecting the insider from the outsider. The many ways in which American 
policy has subordinated the migrant aid in effectively muting the migrant voice to the citizens 
who wield the most political power - those who will thus remain widely negligent to the active 
suppression of migrant communities and, as a result, neglect to use their own political agency in 
combating that suppression. In the United States, where electoral politics is most accessible for 
the fortunate, those who are most underserved have fewer pathways to empowerment. To a 
privileged population that espouses viewpoints such as “your vote is your voice,” the actual 
185 De León, ​The Land of Open Graves, ​199. 
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voice of those who are disenfranchised goes largely unheard - and their oppression is thus likely 
to remain unobstructed. 
 
Conclusion 
Thus, the United States has fulfilled its promise of protection in the eyes of the citizens 
and, at last, become re-legitimized in the reproduction of its sovereignty. The instability of 
sovereignty is central to nationhood, and as such, so is the process of legitimization that the 
nation-state must engage in over and over again. Therefore, the foundation of American 
sovereignty rests not only in the ongoing production of xenophobia within its own citizens, but 
also in its subsequent promise to provide security for its citizens to protect them from the very 
threat the state created. If American legitimacy is grounded in the manufactured discourses of 
danger regarding the migrant, and the following promise of security against the migrant, then 
such legitimacy is dependent on that threat remaining as it is: impending, but external. Therefore, 
it is not simply the promise of security that legitimizes the state; it is also the fulfilment of that 
promise that ultimately completes the cycle of reproduction. Under the knowledge that failing to 
deliver on such a promise will disrupt this cycle, the American state must then resort to 
necropolitical policy - exercising sovereignty by exercising the right to expose migrants to 
violence, exploitation, death.  The political erasure of the migrant is at the core of this process, 186
muting the migrant voice and allowing the nation-state to take hold of their narrative; a narrative 
that the United States has wielded as a spectacle of securitization for its citizens, who remain 
ignorant to the brutal soil upon which American sovereignty is founded. The policies, and their 
186 Mbembe, "Necropolitics," 12. 
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consequences, that I have analyzed in this chapter demonstrate something specific: the state’s 
sovereign right to death and violence, forcing migrants into conditions that will likely result in 
their death, or, at the very least, traumatization. Thus, the United States has momentarily fulfilled 
the promise to secure its citizens against a threat fabricated by the state in the first place.  
The United States should serve as an example of the repercussions of nation-building and 
border securitization, but it is certainly not the only instance of necropolitical border policy in the 
world. In fact, what I have described of the U.S.-Mexico border is not an anomaly. The 
international system is dependent on a series of imagined communities whose existence relies on 
borders that demarcate insiders from outsiders, yet the consequences of producing inorganic 
boundaries becomes evident in the actual function of nation-state: it is a relentless machine of 
self-production, engaging in a never-ending quest for legitimacy. In doing this, the state takes 
advantage of perhaps some of the most vulnerable people within the international 
system—people fleeing violence, poverty, and persecution. The nation-state does not simply fail 
migrants. It exploits them, forcing them into the role of a hollow threat that ends in them paying 
with their lives. Ultimately, necropolitics is not an abnormality within the international system, 
or even an unfortunate risk of the system—but an inevitable symptom of the logic of nationhood. 
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Conclusion 
My research began with a simple question. In the wake of limitless brutality that seemed to 
define dynamics of migration in the United States, I had to ask why the migrant was so 
destabilizing that their presence in the country warranted senseless violence. As I worked to 
resolve this conundrum, my findings broadened and narrowed until I was left with a single 
conclusion that illuminated the answer to my question as though erupted in flames. The violence 
inflicted on those who dare to cross international borders ​isn’t​ senseless, but the wanton 
operation of a political machinery vested with its own preservation. In short, the migrant is 
destabilizing because the nation-state needs them to be. In the grand operation of nationalization, 
the transnationality of the migrant is symptomatic, presenting both a great threat to and an 
essential condition of its existence. As migrants innately challenge the logic of nationhood, their 
lives are reduced to a point at which they are exposed to the forces of sovereign violence, 
transformed into a political tool of sovereign reproduction. This process functions as a cycle that 
is vicious as it is effective, a testimony to the subordination and exploitation vital to the 
nation-state’s continued sovereignty. 
The first chapter of this thesis illustrated a paradox of national sovereignty, observing the 
condition of inclusion and exclusion that appears critical to the foundation of the nation-state. I 
then destabilized this dichotomy, emphasizing how the transnationality of the migrant 
complicates the logic of nationhood and borders, and furthermore, threatens to reveal the 
constructed nature of nationalization. In doing so, the ingrained condition of transnationality that 
accompanies migration threatens the very identity of the nation-state, which operates on the 
assumption that it is an organic source of sovereignty. I then detail how the state manages to 
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neutralize the threat that the migrant inherently poses: it is not the elimination of the threat that 
the state requires, but the dissemination of discourse that portrays migrants as destabilizing 
factors to national security and prosperity. This use of discursive power allows the nation-state to 
engage in the performative production of its own sovereignty, and the paradox of national 
sovereignty materializes: as the transnational nature of migration resists logic of the nation-state, 
the nation-state simultaneously relies upon this resistance in order to legitimize its sovereignty. 
Effectively, the transnational migrant is a condition of the nation-state’s existence and the key 
element in the production of sovereignty.  
The second chapter analyzed the function of national borders, first examining the 
conventional wisdom that portrays borders as territorially-bound barriers. I argued against this 
conception, aiming to demonstrate that the border is aphysical rather than geographic, providing 
not a physical boundary between insiders and outsiders but a condition of existence imposed 
upon those at the intersection of sovereignty and statelessness. The national border, I asserted, is 
not affixed to the seam of two nation-states, but permeates the entirety of the nation-state as a 
condition of exception foisted upon those who find themselves at a particular political 
localization. In the next section, I provided an analysis of Agamben’s notion of sacred life as it 
pertains to national borders. I examined how the aphysical localization of national borders allows 
them to act as a rendering process, rather than a barrier, that strips migrants of their political life 
and exposes them to sovereign violence. I argued that this process resists the perception of 
citizenship as a binary and instead exposes it to be a spectrum which can be divided into three 
ambiguous and flexible classifications of anti-citizen, quasi-citizen, and citizen - each being 
defined not by their relation to inclusion, but to death. Finally, I considered how the 
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border-rendering process promotes the deliberate erasure and exploitation of the migrant. I 
conclude that the nation-state weaponizes national borders as means of engaging in a process of 
sovereign reproduction. This process allows the reduction of the migrant to bare life with the 
purpose of exposing them to sovereign violence. As a result of this imposition, the nation-state 
subjugates the migrant through means of labor exploitation, detention, and physical harm. 
The final chapter provided an empirical account of my findings, detailing the operation of 
the Southwestern United States border with Mexico. I observed the discourses of danger that 
surround the presence of Mexican and Central American migrants in the United States, 
attempting to destabilize the conventions that convey migrants as threats to economic and 
personal security. I then attempted to exhibit the true accomplishment of these discourses of 
danger, analyzing policies of illegalization, deterrence, and zero-tolerance. Finally, I concluded 
how, through the exploitation and erasure of the migrant within the United States, the 
nation-state fulfills a cycle of self-reproduction and, in doing so, strengthens its own sovereignty. 
It is upon the theft of the migrant narrative in which the state may ultimately begin its cycle of 
sovereign reproduction, achieved only through the employment of brutal strategy. My definitive 
intention was to illustrate how national sovereignty requires the subordination and violation of 
migrants, laying the bloody groundwork upon which every nation-state is constructed. 
The theoretical framework and empirical study I have provided in this thesis largely 
examines the nation-state and its operation, illustrating the way in which migration is 
weaponized in order to achieve the never-ending production of sovereignty. However, as I 
conclude this paper, I do not wish the reader to conceive of migrants themselves as a non-agentic 
tool of national configuration. The perception of otherized individuals as powerless victims is no 
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more productive than considering them to be hazardous threats, and only serves to embolden 
conventions of superiority that have allowed hegemonic nation-states to exploit the condition of 
migration in the first place. Despite the grim undertone of my analysis, I wish to impart upon the 
reader that migrant communities around the world have exercised their agency not in spite of, but 
against​ the violence imposed upon them by nationalization - for as the nation-state constructs its 
own legitimacy against the identity of the “other,” migrant communities have constructed 
empowerment against these conditions of oppression.  
As a final note, I turn to a case in Fort Meyers, Florida, where nearly 100,000 migrants 
turned out in waves to protest the introduction of the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and 
Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R. 4437). The bill at hand proposed severe 
securitization of the border as well as interior enforcement, seeking to both heighten the 
criminalization of unauthorized border crossing as well as discourage citizens from aiding 
unauthorized migrants in their journey. Chris Zepeda Millán demonstrates how, despite existing 
research claiming that Latin American migrants in the United States were the least likely to 
participate in political activism, the threat of H.R. 4337 sparked a far-reaching, community-based 
movement against harmful policy. The array of political actors engaged in this movement was 
incredibly diverse, with the coalition of the march composed of three organizations: the Concilio 
Mexicano de la Florida (the Concilio), a group representing over 300 mostly Mexican small 
businesses; the Coalición de Ligas Hispanas del estado de la Florida, a regional coalition of 
Latino immigrant soccer leagues with over 10,000 players; and a collective of a handful of 
independent immigrant activists who called themselves Inmigrantes Latinos Unidos de la Florida 
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(ILUF).  The solidarity exhibited among this array of actors was accomplished by a subordinate 187
group that managed to construct its own spaces of empowerment that remained free from 
intervention from above, achieved only by the community roots and the political autonomy of 
the activists involved - undeniably developing “oppositional consciousness and actions” against 
the subordination of the state. Zepeda Millán illustrates the agency employed by these 
communities that allowed the mobilization of such a movement, noting organizers who drove 
hours from their homes to speak to crowds regarding the impact of H.R. 4437; radio DJs who 
used their publicity to advertise the march; domestic workers who distributed flyers; laborers 
who organized through their network of colleagues; and owners of food trucks who distributed 
free meals and water at coalition meetings.  It was individual action as well as the work of the 188
coalitions that contributed to the success of the demonstration. One participant was quoted to say 
that this action “gave people the confidence to participate … because they knew we were all 
going to be there … and that immigration, the police, or whoever [wouldn’t be able to] take 
everyone away.”  
The activism surrounding H.R. 4437 may not be a well-known instance in the scope of 
migration discourse, yet I believe it conveys spectacular resistance in the face of subordination. 
The protest of H.R. 4337 demonstrates the awe-inspiring capacity of marginalized groups, who 
relied on the resources of only their own communities to develop spaces of empowerment and 
demonstrate their discontent. The case in Fort Meyers exhibits both the heterogeneity of a largely 
homogenized group wielding their individuality as soccer players, business owners, domestic 
and manual workers, and organizers to achieve a collective identity that made their political 
187 Chris Zepeda Millán, “Weapons of the (Not So) Weak: Immigrant Mass Mobilization in the U.S. South,” ​Critical 
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demonstration possible. What this single case captures is the spirit of communities who have 
been the target of sovereign violence; the intrinsic flaw in the national process of sovereign 
reproduction. The dynamic, cyclical process of sovereign legitimation relies on the constant 
reconstruction of an identity against an external body; a body which in turn must be brutalized 
and subordinated in order to fortify the nation-state. However, the nation-state has never, and 
will never, achieve full control over the migrant narrative. The weapon of sovereign violence 
will never achieve stasis of national sovereignty, for as it is employed over and over again, it 
provides something against which the subordinated may forge their own collective identity. As I 
have stated, the migrant is a destabilizing figure only in that the nation-state requires it to be. 
This is the primordial flaw of the nation-state: as the nation-state requires instability, it depends 
on brutality to contain it - and it is this brutality which produces the formation of identity among 
the marginalized. Ultimately, the necropolitical foundation upon which the nation-state stands is 
its fundamental weakness, as the targets of sovereign violence will never remain fully suppressed 
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